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Blights Out and Property Rights in New 
Orleans Post-Katrina 
YXTA MAYA MURRAY† 
ABSTRACT 
In 2018’s Saint Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 
Federal Appeals Judge Timothy Dyk reversed a lower court decision 
finding that the federal government had violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause rights cherished by home-owning New 
Orleanians. The lower court maintained that such taking occurred 
via the Army Corps of Engineers’ building, maintaining, and failing 
to maintain the seventy-six mile long navigational channel known 
as the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO), which increased the 
surge storms of Hurricane Katrina. Though MRGO helped turn 
Katrina into a superstorm that devastated thousands of properties, 
Judge Dyk determined that the lower court’s takings analysis proved 
fatally flawed because it pivoted on government omission and failed 
to consider the totality of circumstances. 
In line with my ongoing work in Community Constitutionalism, I 
study the art of a New Orleans-based collective called Blights Out, 
whose members have staged performances and actions that protest 
how people of color have been deprived of property post-Katrina. 
Through careful analysis of their billboards and engagements, I 
tease out two legal arguments made by the collective: First, that the 
government may wrongfully deprive the people of property through 
omission. Second, that the window of time within which such 
takings may be discerned proves much wider than that imagined by 
Judge Dyk’s description of the “totality of circumstances.” Depending 
on the work of popular constitutionalists and my previous study of 
 
† Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Thank you to the Andy Warhol 
Foundation for awarding me a 2018 Art Writer’s Grant to support the writing of 
this Article. Thank you also to Carl Joe Williams, Imani Jacqueline Brown, 
Mariama Eversley, Linda Santi, Joe Singer, and Chris Serkin. 
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the linkages between art and jurisprudence, I conclude that Blights 
Out’s legal thought offers a powerful rejoinder to Judge Dyk’s 
analysis, and offers important arguments for the future applications 
of takings law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October-November of 2017, a billboard boasting the 
slogan BLIGHTS OUT FOR MAYOR presided over the 
intersection of Galvez Street and Orleans Avenue in New 
Orleans’ Tremé neighborhood.1 The sign, designed by 
illustrator Hannah Chalew, depicted a black-and-white 
drawing of a busted and moss-overgrown house. A sinuous 
vein of red text outlined the scene: Ecological apartheid 
(spatial segregation) is already etched into our housing 
landscape. Will our future city be a gentrified fortress 
designed to protect the wealthy from the rising-up of seas and 
people? A black-and-white caption crowned the spectacle: 
#TellYourMayor/We Demand/Truth and Reconciliation/ 
On Gentrification.2 
The faux political campaign and very real public art of 
the NOLA-based arts collective Blights Out3 targeted the 
violent redistribution of property rights that has changed the 
class structure and complexion of New Orleans in the 
thirteen years since Hurricane Katrina landed in 2005.4 
Initiated in 2014 with a performance called “Home Court 
Crawl,”5 and formalized with a manifesto composed on the 
eve of the ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina,6 
Blights Out embarked upon a host of engagements in 
addition to its Mayoral campaign. In 2016, it “R[a]n for 
 
  1. Hannah Shalew, Ecological Apartheid, BLIGHTS OUT, http:// 
www.blightsout.org/mayor, slide #7 (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 4. See infra text accompanying note 86. 
 5. Projects, Home Court Crawl, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/ 
projects (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 6. An Invitation is a Call to Action, or, A Composite Prose Portrait of What 
Folks from Blights Out are Feeling, Thinking, & Talking About on the 10th 
Anniversary of Katrina, BLIGHTS OUT (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.blightsout.org/ 
home/ (“On August 15, 2015, members of Blights Out—natives and newcomers—
were asked to share one word to describe how they were feeling as the 10th 
Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina approached. . . .”). 
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President,” using placards that boasted slogans such as 
“Black Land Matters,” “Look Me In the Eye,” and “50 Years 
Later We Still Need Decent Housing Fit For Human 
Beings.”7 And in the years previous, it hosted other events, 
including 2015’s “Live Action Painting” program, a 
participatory illustration happening that involved artists 
painting blighted homes in New Orleans.8 
Blights Out is the brainchild of Imani Jacqueline 
Brown,9 Mariama Eversley, Byran C. Lee,10 Jr., Lisa Sigal,11 
Sue Press,12 and Carl Joe Williams;13 except for Sigal, who is 
an Anglo woman based in Brooklyn,14 these members are or 
were New Orleans residents and are African-American.15 
These artists, architects, community organizers, and 
activists together create public art engagements resisting 
the destruction that Katrina, the state, and gentrification 
have wreaked upon New Orleans’ communities of color. 
Through their work, they make arguments about the precise 
ways in which the “government,” otherwise called the 
“regime,”16 has deprived people of property upon the landfall 
 
 7. See Projects, Blights Out for President, BLIGHTS OUT, http:// 
www.blightsout.org/projects (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 8. Projects, Live Action Painting, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/ 
projects (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 9. Imani Jacqueline Brown, Bio, http://www.imanijacquelinebrown.net/bio 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 10. For an example of Bryan C. Lee’s work, see Architecture Could Be The 
Best Weapon Against Extremism (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=sNqc85UZtOo. 
 11. See Lisa Sigal, Bio, http://lisasigal.net/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 12. For an example of Sue Press’s work, see Sue Press of the Ole & Nu Style 
Fellas on Mentoring (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ax5Ywl 
48v_U. 
 13. Carl Joe Williams, Bio & CV, http://www.carljoewilliams.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2019).  
 14. Sigal, supra note 11. 
 15. See supra notes 9–10 and 12–13. 
 16. See Disaster Capitalism, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/mayor 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
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of Katrina in ‘05 and in the years since. Specifically, the 
artists of Blights Out maintain that “government”17 forces 
have “pushed out”18 or deprived people of color of housing 
through both bad acts as well as (critically, for this article) 
omissions.19 Blights Out artists also assert that the events 
that created this deprivation extend beyond the days and 
weeks surrounding Katrina, and encompass the 
government’s later acts of auctioning “blighted” properties 
and its supports of neoliberal forces that have permitted the 
supplanting of community members through 
gentrification.20 
These declarations pertain to legal problems, in 
particular, those raised by Saint Bernard Parish 
Government v. United States (Saint Bernard Parish II).21 In 
that 2018 opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed22 a 2015 Court of Federal Claims 
decision (Saint Bernard Parish I)23 finding that the federal 
government had temporarily taken property in New Orleans 
by erecting, expanding, maintaining, and failing to maintain 
the seventy-six mile long navigational challenge known as 
the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO), whose structural 
flaws leveraged the “surge” of Hurricane Katrina24 (the 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., infra note 497 and accompanying text (“In works such as Home 
Court Crawl, Live Action Painting, and 50 Years Later, We Still Need Housing 
Fit for Human Beings, Blights Out contends that property may be wrested from 
the people via government omissions.”). 
 20. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (“Blights Out shows that the 
property deprivation . . .”). 
 21. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. St. Bernard Par. v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 796 (2019). 
 22. Id. at 1368. 
 23. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 24. Id. at 723 (“The funnel effect caused by the MR–GO further exacerbated 
the increased storm surge that resulted from Hurricane Katrina.”). 
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Supreme Court declined certiorari in 2018).25 In Saint 
Bernard Parish II, Judge Timothy Dyk held that lower court 
Judge Susan Braden erred because takings could not be 
based on inaction (such as that occurring when the Army 
Corps failed to maintain the MRGO),26 and because Braden’s 
causation analysis failed to consider “both risk-increasing 
and risk-decreasing government actions over a period of time 
to determine whether the totality of the government’s actions 
caused the injury.”27 Specifically, Judge Dyk criticized Judge 
Braden’s failure to consider the ameliorative effects of a 
federally-built barrier wall known as the “Barrier Plan,” or 
“LPV.”28 Judge Dyk reasoned that “the result is that 
plaintiffs [and Judge Braden] failed to take account of other 
government actions . . . that mitigated the impact of MRGO 
and may well have placed the plaintiffs in a better position 
than if the government had taken no action at all.”29 The 
burden of proving that the plaintiffs were not in a “better 
position” than they would have been if the government had 
simply done nothing, Dyk emphasized, belonged with, and 
was not carried by, the plaintiffs.30 
Thus, Blights Out artists offer alternative legal theories 
about the nature of takings than we see in Judge Dyk’s 2018 
opinion: First, Blights Out’s legal thought clashes with Judge 
Dyk’s holding that omission cannot give rise to a claim that 
the government has wrongfully deprived people of property. 
Second, Blights Out argues that government takings take 
place within a larger framing of the “totality of government’s 
 
 25. St. Bernard Par. v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 196 (2019). 
 26. Saint Bernard Par. II at 1360 (“While the theory that the government 
failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may state a tort 
claim, it does not state a takings claim.”). 
 27. Id. at 1365. 
 28. Id. at 1364 (“[A]nd the Claims Court’s causation findings took no account 
of the risk-decreasing impact of the LPV levee construction.”). 
 29. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 1362 (“It is well established that a takings plaintiff bears the burden 
of proof to establish that the government action caused the injury.”). 
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actions” than Dyk would admit as relevant, including the 
later auctionings and supports of neoliberalism that led to 
the restructuring of New Orleans demographics from 2005 to 
the present day. If Blights Out is correct, and omissions may 
create wrongful deprivations of property, and if there is 
merit to their argument that the “totality of the 
government’s actions” to be considered in that analysis 
encompasses a wider window of events than that entertained 
by Judge Dyk,31 the collective’s work offers a powerful 
rejoinder to Saint Bernard Parish II. 
In this article, I will consider whether and how Blights 
Out’s insights matter to the law—and conclude that they 
can, and they should, on account of the jurisprudential 
theory that scholars such as Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres 
have branded Demosprudence,32 Reva Siegel, Robert Post 
and Jack Balkin have called Popular Constitutionalism,33 
and that I have described as Community 
Constitutionalism.34 I also conclude that Blights Out’s “legal 
thought”35 deserves attention based on jurisprudential work 
that acknowledges how visual and other forms of art offer 
revelations that legal discourse would do well to recognize.36 
 
 31. See infra note 383 and accompanying text (“Blights Out artists do not 
focus only government’s conduct in the immediacy and direct aftermath of the 
flood, but look at a wide window of events that include later backing of market 
forces that exclude Black people from their neighborhoods and city.”). 
 32. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (“Guinier and Torres also study 
how the growth . . .”). 
 33. See infra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (“Renowned popular 
constitutionalism theorists . . .”). 
 34. Yxta Maya Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, 43 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 125 (2019) [hereinafter Murray, The Takings Clause of 
Boyle Heights] (describing Community Constitutionalism). 
 35. See id. (discussing Community Jurisprudence). 
 36. Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Rape Trauma] (“My in-
depth study of visual arts in connection with rape law is also, I believe, an 
innovation within this field. It constitutes an effort to incorporate art’s 
revelations of women’s buried experience—or, as I conceive of these details, 
artifacts—into legal understandings.”). 
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Further, I contend that Blights Out artists, who have 
weathered the rigors of not only Katrina but also federal and 
state failures to care for residents in the ensuing years, are 
in an excellent position to offer interpretations of what 
constitutes New Orleans-specific takings—that is, that they 
can offer us relevant points of view that Judge Dyk, who was 
born in Massachusetts, went to Harvard, and sits in D.C.,37 
may simply not have access to. 
In Part I of this Article, I will set forth a brief history of 
New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina, and its aftermath. In Part 
II, I will recount the decision of Judge Susan Braden of the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, which found the 
Army Corps of Engineers effected a temporary taking by 
building, expanding, maintaining, and failing to maintain 
the MRGO. In Part III, I will describe the Federal Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s reversal of Judge Braden’s 
decision, in the opinion by Judge Timothy B. Dyk. In Part IV, 
I will set forth the theories of Demosprudence, Popular, and 
Community Constitutionalism, and the theory of what I have 
called “artifacts,” which validate the art of Blights Out as an 
interpretive tool for the takings question engaged by Judges 
Braden and Dyk. In Part V, I will analyze the art of Blights 
Out, and its construals of omission and the “totality of 
government actions” as they relate to Saint Bernard Parish 
I and II. Finally, in Part VI, I will apply the legal thought of 
Blights Out to the takings question, subjecting it to Jack 
Balkin’s famous test of whether its constitutional positions 
are “on” or “off” “the wall.”38 Finding that Blights Out’s legal 
thought is on the wall, I will study how it supports Judge 
Braden’s finding that the federal government did effect a 
 
 37. See Timothy Dyk, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Timothy_Dyk (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 38. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677, 679 (2005) [hereinafter Balkin, 
“Wrong the Day it Was Decided”] (suggesting that “conventions determining what 
is a good or bad legal argument about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal 
claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in response to changing social, 
political, and historical conditions.”). 
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temporary taking of property by engaging in acts and 
omissions that stripped the people of New Orleans of their 
homes. 
I. THE HISTORY OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND ITS IMPACT ON 
NEW ORLEANS, WITH A FOCUS ON THE LOWER NINTH WARD 
AND SAINT BERNARD PARISH 
As laid out in Judge Susan Braden’s expansive 58-page 
opinion, St. Bernard Parish Government and Other Owners 
of Real Property in St. Bernard Parish or the Lower Ninth 
Ward of the City of New Orleans v. United States (2015), 
New Orleans possesses a panoramic history, extending back 
to France’s 1718 founding of Nouvelle-Orléans on the St. 
Bernard Delta,39 and New Orleans’ acquisition by the United 
States in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase.40 Louisiana has a 
long track record of the exploitation of people of color and 
inequality. Slavery was instituted in Louisiana by virtue of 
the Black Code of 180641 and fostered by the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 185042 and the Dred Scott v. Sandford43 decision of 
the United States Supreme Court. In the 1800s, however, a 
tradition of Black and minority home ownership was 
 
 39. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 693 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 40. Id. at 694. 
 41. See Black Code, Act of June 7, 1806, as amended April 14, 1807 
(“prescribing the rules and conduct to be observed with respect to Negroes and 
other Slaves of this Territory.”); see Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Strange 
Science of Codifying Slavery-Moreau Lislet and the Louisiana Digest of 1808, 24 
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 83, 113 (2009). 
 42. James Oliver Horton & Lois E. Horton, A Federal Assault: African 
Americans and the Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1179, 1180 (1993) (“The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 expanded the power of 
slavery to reach into any state to retrieve those accused of fleeing from 
bondage.”). 
 43. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, a Missouri slave 
whose master had taken him to a free state sued for freedom, but the Supreme 
Court held that neither he nor his family were entitled to liberty because they 
were not citizens. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2008). 
10 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
instituted in the Lower Ninth Ward, when poor African 
Americans and immigrants began to build homes there 
because they were “unable to afford land on higher ground.”44 
This led to a significant proportion of Black and minority 
home-ownership,45 but titles to these properties were not 
always recorded, a dilemma that continued through 2005.46 
Through the 20th century, Black citizens in New Orleans 
experienced manifold oppressions, including police 
brutality,47 segregation,48 and, despite high rates of home 
ownership, housing insecurity and disastrously poor housing 
conditions.49 Income inequality and its effects persisted up to 
the time of Katrina: In 2005, it was estimated that 36% of 
 
 44. Water Resources Management Practicum 2007, Wetland Restoration and 
Community-Based Development Bayou Bienvenue, Lower Ninth Ward, New 
Orleans (2008), https://www.nelson.wisc.edu/docs/neworleans07.pdf. 
 45. Rachel Breunlin & Helen A. Regis, Putting the Ninth Ward on the Map: 
Race, Place, and Transformation in Desire, New Orleans, 108 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 744 (2006) (discussing high home-ownership in the Lower 
Ninth Ward prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). 
 46. Katy Reckdahl, ‘We can do this’: Lower 9th Ward residents focus on need 
to clear overgrown lots, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (July 15, 2018), https:// 
www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/article_c62e602c-8889-11e8-a44f-e7e9 
48d36847.html (“At the root of the problem are families who, lacking a clear title 
to the property where they had lived, perhaps for generations, were ineligible for 
rebuilding money after Katrina.”); Josephine Ross, Still in Limbo: The 
Continuing Failed Response to Katrina, 51 HOW. L.J. 565, 618 n.63 (2008) 
(“[M]any New Orleans families, particularly in low-income areas, simply have 
passed homes down informally through the generations without filing succession 
papers.”) (quoting Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, Pro Bono—The New 
Orleans Project, http://www.wcsr.com/default.asp?id=684). 
 47. LEONARD MOORE, BLACK RAGE IN NEW ORLEANS: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 
AFRICAN AMERICAN ACTIVISM: FROM WORLD WAR II TO HURRICANE KATRINA 8 
(2010) (“In the 1940s, returning black World War II veterans and other African 
Americans with heightened expectations in the immediate postwar period came 
under attack, while in the 1950s and 1960s traditional civil rights activists were 
often brutalized for demanding integration and voting rights.”). 
 48. WALTER STERN, RACE AND EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: CREATING THE 
SEGREGATED CITY, 1764–1960 (2018) (describing violent white reaction to 
attempted desegregation in 1960). 
 49. ORISSA AREND, SHOWDOWN IN DESIRE: THE BLACK PANTHERS TAKE A STAND 
IN NEW ORLEANS 4 (2010) (describing a “disast[rous]” housing project for poor 
Black families, built in the 1950s). 
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the Lower Ninth’s residents lived in poverty,50 and in 2018 
the rate was estimated at 33.5%.51 In 2018, it was estimated 
that over 90% of the residents were African American.52 As 
for Saint Bernard Parish, it was established in 1847;53 in 
2018, its residents were 70.9% white,54 and it was estimated 
that 20% of its population lived below the poverty line.55 
Property owners residing in Saint Bernard Parish and 
the Lower Ninth Ward, who brought the takings claim that 
Braden ruled on,56 possess a collective identity as the Saint 
Bernard Polder (that is, low-lying land reclaimed from the 
sea),57 and have historically received protection from storms 
in the form of wetlands.58 Louisiana and the U.S. 
Government first began to construct wetlands-threatening 
waterway navigational canals in 1914 and 1925,59 and by 
1955 the United States Army Corps of Engineers alerted to 
the fact that New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain needed 
 
 50. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Once More, a Neighborhood Sees the Worst, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/09/07/AR2005090702127.html. 
 51. Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood in New Orleans, Louisiana, CITY-
DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/Lower-Ninth-Ward-New-
Orleans-LA.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 52. Race and Ethnicity in Lower 9th Ward, STATISTICAL ATLAS, 
https://statisticalatlas.com/neighborhood/Louisiana/New-Orleans/Lower-9th-
Ward/Race-and-Ethnicity (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 53. RENAE FRIEDLEY, BREAUX BRIDGE 32 (2014). 
 54. QuickFacts St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/map/stbernardparishlouisiana/RHI125217 (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 55. Saint Bernard Parish, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/st.-
bernard-parish-la/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 56. Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 690 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (naming parties). 
 57. Polder, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/polder (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 58. Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 694 (“Historically, these wetlands 
were relatively stable and protected the New Orleans area from catastrophic 
storms.”). 
 59. Id. at 696. 
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additional protection from storms.60 The Corps thus began to 
enact a “Barrier Plan,” constructing floodwalls and other 
devices against the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal 
(IHNC).61 As Judge Braden would note, the Barrier Plan was 
“implemented as the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 
Hurricane Project, known as the LPV, which was to be 
comprised of 125 miles of levees and floodwalls.”62 However, 
by 2005, the Barrier Plan had not yet been completed.63 And 
in 2009, an Army Corps reported observed that “[a]t no time” 
had any parish enjoyed the full protection called for by the 
government.64 
Three years after the U.S. Government had received 
notice that New Orleans needed storm protection,65 the 
Army Corps of Engineers began to implement the first 
expansion of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO),66 a 
seventy-six mile long navigational challenge.67 The federal 
government authorized this construction of a deep-draft 
channel to the west of the Mississippi even though it 
threatened cypress swamps, which were crucial for storm 
protection and would eventually die out due to the change in 
surrounding water salinity.68 In 1958, the United States Fish 
 
 60. Id. at 696–97. 
 61. Id. at 697. The IHNC borders the Lower Ninth Ward, and the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway, which extends from Brownsville, Texas east to 
Carrabelle, Florida. Id. at 696. 
 62. Id. at 697. 
 63. Id. (“As of May 2005, however, only 90% of the LPV was completed in 
Orleans Parish, 70% in Jefferson Parish, 90% in Chalmette, and 60% in St. 
Charles Parish. SPX.0001 at I-28.”). 
 64. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s exhibits). 
 65. Id. at 696 (“Congress authorized the Army Corps to study the need for 
additional hurricane protection along the Southern United States coast [in 
1955].”); id. at 698 (“During 1958–1968, The Army Corps Of Engineers 
Constructed And Implemented The First Expansion Of The Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 691. 
 68. See id. at 699. 
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& Wildlife Service warned the Army Corps of Engineers that 
the channel would destroy the trees and threaten local floral 
and faunal “disaster,” as well as increase salinity and 
turbidity in the area.69 It recommended delaying the project 
in light of these findings, but the Army Corps of Engineer did 
not respond to this counsel.70 The construction of MRGO 
continued apace.71 
By 1968, the Army Corps completed a third expansion of 
MRGO, leading to the burial of over 10,000 acres of 
swampland and eradication of 2,116 acres of salt marsh and 
swamp and 36 acres of trees.72 At this point, the MRGO 
possessed 24 miles of levee,73 including a portion protecting 
Saint Bernard/Chalmette and Orleans Parish East.74 
Together, these levee portions created the funnel that would 
prove a delivery system of an astronomical tide wave75 
during Katrina, because of what are known as Reach 1 and 
Reach 2 of MRGO: These are, respectively, the east-west 
section running between the IHNC and the Gulf Intracoastal 
Waterway/MR-GO and a longer southeast-northwest 
section.76 In particular, the confluence of the Waterway and 
the MRGO created a risk of an extreme storm surge, which 
could now be exacerbated by “conditions” in Lakes 
Pontchartrain and Borgne.77 
In 1998, the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation 
and Restoration Task Force and the Wetlands Conservation 
and Restoration Authority convened experts in wetlands and 
coastal conditions, leading to a report auguring 18-foot storm 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 702–03. 
 73. Id. at 703. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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surges topped by 10-foot waves in the area, which no current 
or proposed prophylaxes could ward off.78 That same year, 
Saint Bernard Parish Government issued a resolution to 
“phas[e] out” MRGO,79 which it called a “superhighway”80 for 
predicted storms. In 2000, the EPA recommended erecting a 
hurricane-protective gate to Saint Bernard Parish and a 
program for redeveloping MRGO destroyed wetlands.81 It 
also recognized that private property had already been 
“washed away” by the effects of the MRGO, and it 
recommended that affected owners be paid fair market value 
for their loss.82 In its conclusions, however, the EPA asserted 
that MRGO-exacerbated storm surges proved only a 
“relatively minor factor” in predicted environmental 
dangers.83 Then, in November 2004 and June 2005, Army 
Corps studies warned of MRGO and Lake Borgne 
deterioration and increased wetland erosion, and predicted 
potential “wakes” from the MRGO if it ever disconnected 
from the lake, as well as increased storm surges.84 
These studies turned out to be “prophetic”85 when 
Hurricane Katrina achieved landfall on the tip of Florida on 
August 26, 2005.86 
While the National Weather Service had been 
disseminating extremely accurate predictions of the 
Hurricane at least two days previous to landfall, the federal 
and state government responders still were not able to react 
to the disaster with any kind of alacrity or efficiency.87 
 
 78. Id. at 704–05. 
 79. Id. at 706. 
 80. Id. at 705. 
 81. Id. at 706. 
 82. Id. at 707. 
 83. Id. at 708. 
 84. Id. at 708–09. 
 85. Id. at 709. 
 86. Id. 
 87. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND 
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Katrina grew to a Category 5 storm on August 28, at around 
midnight.88 This means it blew at least 157 miles per hour.89 
Waves east of the Mississippi River began to crest over 20 
feet.90 The fury forced “considerable” waters against the 
Mississippi Delta and the east-facing levees tracking the 
Mississippi River, also recruiting waters formed in a pocket 
created by the delta and the Mississippi coast.91 The storm 
then hurled into Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain as Katrina 
pushed north.92 Enormous wave force blasted hurricane 
protection systems in Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and 
Orleans Parishes.93 
By 1 p.m., Katrina had been downgraded to a Category 
1 storm, meaning that it raged at 74–95 miles an hour.94 
Still, three breaches occurred at the IHNC, leading to 
flooding in St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward 
that reached from seven to eleven feet.95 Around 70 percent 
of the MRGO levee breached, flooding Saint Bernard 
Parish.96 The Lower Ninth Ward was swallowed by waters 
from Lake Borgne, which battered up the MRGO, and poured 
in through breaches in the IHNC.97 Storm surges eventually 
 
RESPONSE TO KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 11, (Feb. 15, 2006) 
(“Many who escaped the storm’s wrath owe their lives to these agencies’ 
accuracy. . . . We repeatedly tried to determine how government could respond so 
ineffectively to a disaster that was so accurately forecast. How accurately? Storm-
track projections released to the public 56 hours before Katrina came ashore were 
off by only 15 miles. . . . The Hurricane Center’s predicted strength for Katrina 
at landfall, two days before the storm hit, was off the mark by only 10 miles per 
hour.”) [hereinafter A Failure of Initiative]. 
 88. Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 709. 
 89. Id. at 709 n.14. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 710. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 709 n.14. 
 95. Id. at 710–11. 
 96. Id. at 711. 
 97. Id. 
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reached up to 15–19 feet.98 In the end, about 80 percent of 
the city was flooded up to 20 feet a day after landfall,99 and 
between 68% and 98% of homes were “severely damaged or 
destroyed.”100 
Residents who remained in the city were told to go to the 
Superdome, the Convention Center, and interstate bridges 
for safety.101 Many appeared to rely upon the government’s 
assurance that it would help them, and so forewent self-help, 
to their detriment.102 Some members of “[t]he Louisiana 
National Guard ‘participated in . . . securing operations’ at 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 712. 
 100. Id. (citing Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/ (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2019 6:48 PM)); THE DATA CTR., CURRENT HOUSING UNIT DAMAGE 
ESTIMATES HURRICANES KATRINA, RITA, AND WILMA 25 (2006),  https://gnocdc.s3. 
amazonaws.com/reports/Katrina_Rita_Wilma_Damage_2_12_06___revised.pdf 
(“showing that 9,777 of 14,037, i.e., 70%, of owner-occupied housing and 13,695 
of 20,229, i.e., 68%, of renter-occupied housing in St. Bernard Parish was 
classified as ‘Severe/Destroyed.’”). 
 101. A Failure of Initiative, supra note 87, at 6 (quoting Patricia Thompson, 
“We were told to go to the Superdome, the Convention Center, the interstate 
bridge for safety. We did this more than once. In fact, we tried them all for every 
day over a week.”). 
 102. Id. at 282 (quoting Dr. Gregory Henderson, “thousands upon thousands of 
people collected on the boulevard in front of the convention center. There were 
the infants to the elderly in wheelchairs. There were many elderly lying on sheets 
and blankets on the median. There were screaming men, women, and children 
and dazed quiet and confused men, women, and children. Most were African-
American, but many were white.”); see also Roy Bourgeoise, Jr., Living Through 
Hurricane Katrina—An AFA Member’s Account, 3 AFA WATCHBIRD 50, 54 (2005), 
https://journals.tdl.org/watchbird/index.php/watchbird/article/download/3414/33
98 (“Over the next three days, we waited for help that never came.”); Bill Quigley, 
Six Months After Katrina, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 21, 2006), https://www. 
counterpunch.org/2006/02/21/six-months-after-katrina/ (“Over 40 people died in 
the hospital over the next few days as we waited for help.”); Gary Younge & 
Duncan Campbell, Still alive amid the chaos: rescuers arrive at last to discover 
the forgotten survivors, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2005), https://www.theguardian 
.com/world/2005/sep/07/hurricanekatrina.usa2 (“Joseph Kelson, 58, was bleeding 
from a bite from a stray dog and seeking medical attention but, despite the 
presence of more than 20,000 national guardsmen and hundreds of search and 
rescue teams, none was forthcoming. ‘I’ve lost all my friends,’ he said. ‘We waited 
for help but help never came.”). 
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the Superdome.”103 The House Subcommittee report on 
Katrina acknowledged that “[a]t these locations, [victims] . . . 
were subjected to unbearable conditions: limited light, air, 
and sewage facilities in the Superdome, the blistering heat 
of the sun, and in many cases limited food and water.”104 
Survivors reported that neither FEMA nor other 
government responders helped them, and that they endured 
nightmarish conditions, such as sleeping by corpses when 
they ventured out of the Superdome.105 “We never felt so cut 
off in our lives,”a woman named Patricia Thompson 
testified.106 The government did not deliver medical supplies 
for days.107 And in some areas, food, water, and ice deliveries 
were delayed for at least eleven days.108 There was also 
inordinate waste: Two years after Katrina, FEMA threw 
away $100M in ice that it did not supply in ‘05.109 Confusion 
 
 103. A Failure of Initiative, supra note 87, at 67. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. Id. at 6 (quoting Patricia Thompson, “We saw buses, helicopters and 
FEMA trucks, but no one stopped to help us. We never felt so cut off in all our 
lives. When you feel like this you do one of two things, you either give up or go 
into survival mode. We chose the latter. This is how we made it. We slept next to 
dead bodies, we slept on streets at least four times next to human feces and urine. 
There was garbage everywhere in the city. Panic and fear had taken over.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 275 (“With only nominal amounts of medical supplies pre-positioned 
by FEMA and HHS, a great deal of medical provisions had to be supplied after 
Katrina made landfall. In areas like New Orleans, it took days to respond to the 
catastrophe and deliver medical supplies to the Superdome and Convention 
Center. The delays were a result of poor planning.”). 
 108. Id. at 83 (“According to Dr. Walter Maestri, the Jefferson Parish Director 
of Emergency Management, he understood that FEMA may not provide help 
until 48–72 hours later—but then he expected help. That is, once the state cleared 
the roads, he anticipated that FEMA trucks would arrive with large quantities of 
water, food, and ice. Although these were the parish’s planning assumptions, he 
said FEMA did not get substantial relief to the parish until 11 days after 
landfall.”). 
 109. John Cochran, 85M Pounds of Ice Going Down the Drain, ABC (July 15, 
2007), https://abcnews.go.com/amp/WN/story?id=3379974&page=1; Chris 
Edwards, Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures, CATO (Aug. 27, 
2015, 2:56 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-remembering-
federal-failures (“Two years after the storm, the agency ended up throwing out 
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between state and federal responders led to corpses being left 
unrecovered for days.110 Federal attention was so lacking 
that Canadian Mounties were often first responders, which 
led some residents to feel forsaken by their own 
government.111 
Meanwhile, thousands of members of the National 
Guard flowed into New Orleans, and on September 7 were 
given Title 32 status retroactive to August 29,112 two days 
after George Bush had declared a state of emergency.113 I 
argue that this means that the Guard were under federal, 
not state, authority.114 Though the Guard had been ordered 
 
$100 million of unused ice.”); see also REP. BENNIE G. THOMPSON, “ONE YEAR 
LATER: KATRINA’S WASTE” 14 (2006), https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/ 
49398606/one-year-later-katrinas-waste-a-report-detailing-contracting-. 
 110. A Failure of Initiative, supra note 87, at 299 (“Body recovery was no less 
confused. For days, bodies went uncollected as state and federal officials 
remained indecisive on a body recovery plan.”). 
 111. See Cecilia M. Vega, The parish that feds overlooked / Canadian group 
reached St. Bernard before U.S. troops, S. F. GATE, (Sept. 15, 2005, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/The-parish-that-feds-overlooked-Canadian-
group-2609002.php; Telephone Interview with Linda Santi (Dec. 27, 2018) (“The 
first humans that those guys saw were Canadian mounted police patrol. So you 
didn’t feel like the U.S.A. was in it, was in the game. When you look up and see 
the Canadian Mounted Police as the first public support you’re starting to feel 
like you’ve gone through the looking glass.”). 
 112. JAMES A. WOMBSHELL, ARMY SUPPORT DURING THE HURRICANE KATRINA 




 113. Bush Declares State of Emergency, FOX NEWS (Aug. 28, 2005), https:// 
www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,167240,00.html. 
 114. While National Guard members are usually considered state employees, 
“the Army and Air National Guard of the United States, established and 
maintained under Congress’ army power, function as reserves in the 
United States Army and Air Force ‘to provide trained units and qualified persons 
available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency 
and at such other times as the national security requires.’” Md. for Use of Levin 
v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 41 (1965), vacated on other grounds, Md. for the 
Use of Levin v. United States, 382 U.S. 159 (1965) (treating military members of 
the Guard as employees of the States, not the Federal Government); see Perpich 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 880 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
Perpich stated, “federal authority over the National Guard in a national 
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to New Orleans by President Bush, they were beguiled by 
false reports of rapes, murders, and sniping.115 So 
intimidated, the Guards “refused” to approach the 
Superdome until September 2, 100 hours after the hurricane, 
until “‘we had enough force in place to do an overwhelming 
force,’” Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau, told reporters on September 3.116 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco described the 
“‘landing’” in New Orleans of “‘troops of [National Guard 
soldiers117] fresh from Iraq, well trained, experienced, battle 
 
emergency is preeminent. In such a narrow circumstance, state authority is 
superseded.” Id. Further, “[S]ection 325 of Title 32 provides as follows: ‘(a) Each 
member of the Army National Guard of the United States . . . who is ordered to 
active duty is relieved from duty in the National Guard of his State or 
Territory. . . .’” Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(citing 32 U.S.C. § 325). 
Moreover, National Guardsmen who dispatch their duties under Title 32 will be 
immune from state common law tort claims under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2671, 2679(d), which strengthens my characterization of the Guardsmen in 
New Orleans as federal employees. Gilmore v. Mississippi, 905 F.3d 781, 786 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (“The Westfall Act ‘accords federal employees absolute immunity from 
common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their 
official duties.’”) (internal citation omitted). In Gilmore, the 5th Circuit held that 
“[a]lthough National Guard members do not normally fall within the definition 
of ‘federal employees,’ they are covered by the Westfall Act when ‘engaged in . . . 
duty under section . . . 502 . . . of title 32.’” Id. at 784–95 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671). 
Note that section 502(f) of title 32 refers to “Support of operations or missions 
undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary of 
Defense.” 34 § 502(f)(2)(A). Further, National Guardsmen dispatching active 
duties during emergencies qualify as federal employees for the purposes of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (West 2019) (“‘Employee of the 
government’ includes (1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of 
the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard 
while engaged in training or duty under section . . . 502 . . . of title 32.”). Again, 
section 502(f) of title 32 refers to “[s]upport of operations or missions undertaken 
by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.” 32 
U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A); see also In re Minasian, No. SACV180205AG(JCGX), 2018 
WL 1940402, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018) (“Congress has defined ‘employee of 
the government’ to include National Guard members serving under 32 U.S.C. 
[§] 502 in other statutory schemes.”). 
 115. A Failure of Initiative, supra note 87, at 171. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Troops told ‘shoot to kill’ in New Orleans, ABC AUSTL. (Sept. 1, 2005, 
2:25 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-09-02/troops-told-shoot-to-kill-in-
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tested . . . [and who were] ready to shoot to kill, and they are 
more than willing to do so if necessary, and I expect they 
will.’”118 President Bush contributed to the Black 
community’s objectification and perhaps psychological 
alienation119 by announcing that there would be “‘zero 
tolerance’ for armed gangs and profiteers.”120 
Tragically, these threats came to pass, as the people of 
New Orleans experienced catastrophic police brutality, 
despite the supposedly protective presence of the National 
Guard: On September 4, 2005, four New Orleans police 
officers shot six unarmed civilians on the Danzinger Bridge, 
killing seventeen-year-old James Brissette and Ronald 
Madison, a 40-year-old mentally disabled man.121 Though 
the officers, when first tried and convicted in 2011, received 
sentences of between 38 to 65 years, federal prosecutors 
committed misconduct during the proceedings by posting 
false stories about the officers in the comments sections of 
NOLA.com.122 When retried, convicted, and sentenced in 
2016, the killers received time served and between 7 to 
twelve years.123 
Other horrors also mounted: Public housing projects run 
 
new-orleans/2094678 (“A detachment of 300 National Guard troops have landed 
in anarchic New Orleans with the authorization to shoot and kill ‘hoodlums’, 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco says.”). 
 118. JOHN ARENA, DRIVEN FROM NEW ORLEANS: HOW NONPROFITS BETRAY 
PUBLIC HOUSING AND PROMOTE PRIVATIZATION 159 (2012). 
 119. Jordan T. Camp, “We Know This Place”: Neoliberal Racial Regimes and 
the Katrina Circumstance, 61 AM. Q. 693, 698–99 (2009) (“The White House’s 
position on this specific response is unambiguous: ‘The security situation is a 
concern. It is a priority . . . [a]nd there is a zero tolerance approach.’ . . . The 
Katrina circumstance instances a pattern of militarization of the urban spaces 
inhabited by the racialized poor that serves to protect bourgeois property 
interests.”). 
 120. Troops told ‘shoot to kill’ in New Orleans, supra note 117. 
 121. Danziger Bridge officers sentenced: 7 to 12 years for shooters, cop in cover-
up gets 3, NOLA.COM (Apr. 20, 2016, 11:13 PM) https://www.nola.com/crime/ 
index.ssf/2016/04/danziger_bridge_officers_sente.html 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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by the Housing Authority of New Orleans, which was under 
receivership by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development,124 were sealed up after the storm, and 
residents were not allowed back into their homes, despite 
allegations that the properties had not been badly damaged 
by the floods.125 In addition, there was a spate of physician-
induced “mercy killings” at New Orleans’ Memorial Hospital, 
which faced temperatures of 100 degrees, failing generators, 
and patients who degraded into in extremis conditions.126 
National Guard planes127 airlifted many residents from 
the area, including 600 people transported to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, a majority White city.128 Many people did not even 
know where they were going while en route.129 Other 
civilians were transported to locations in Texas.130 Residents 
 
 124. Cameron French, Hud Returns Housing Authority of New Orleans to Local 
Control, HUD (May 28, 2014), https://archives.hud.gov/news/2014/pr14-058.cfm 
(“HUD took possession of HANO in February of 2002 for substantial default of 
the agency’s obligation set forth in the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC).”). 
 125. GABIV RICHARD, KATRINA: EYES HAVE NOT SEEN, EARS HAVE NOT HEARD 
172 (2008) (“[A]ll of the public housing buildings were sealed up after the storm, 
but they did not suffer any significant flood damage whatsoever. . . . The St. 
Bernard, Lafitte, Magnolia, and Florida projects have yet to be reopened. They 
remain closed and locked up, collecting mold and debris while people are looking 
for a way to return to their homes.”). 
 126. See Carrie Cahn, New Orleans Hospital Staff Discussed Mercy Killings, 
NPR (Feb. 16, 2006, 4:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=5219917. 
 127. Erin Stewart & Pat Reavy, Airlift: For Katrina evacuees, Utah becomes a 
refuge from the storm, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 4, 2005, 12:12 AM), https:// 
www.deseretnews.com/2005/9/4/19910547/Airlift-For-Katrina-evacuees-Utah-
becomes-a-refuge-from-the-storm.html. 
 128. Salt Lake City, Utah Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV. (July 7, 
2009), http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/salt-lake-city-population/. 
 129. Jim Avila, Taken From Bayou to Utah, Katrina Evacuees Try to Adapt, 
ABC (Sept. 14, 2005), https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/HurricaneKatrina/story?id= 
1126273&page=1 (“I asked the stewardess, I said, ‘Ma’am, where are we going?’ 
and she said, ‘Salt Lake City.’ And everybody was like, ‘Uh, Utah? What’s in 
Utah?’”). 
 130. DAVID P. ANDERSON, STORM SURGE: THE ROLE OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD 
IN HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS 17 (2011) (“Victims air-lifted from 
New Orleans International Airport to Kelly Field [in San Antonio] were processed 
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complained of confusion, lack of communication, and of 
having no concept of how to get back home.131 In the end, the 
trauma was so great that about half132 of the city’s people left 
New Orleans, abandoning their homes and properties. At 
least 100,000 never came back.133 The people left because of 
their mental anguish,134 as well as the unaffordable 
demolition and blight liens that began to pile up against their 
properties.135 This abandonment exacerbated the damage 
that New Orleans properties suffered, leading to “blight.”136 
 
for further transport to one of the nearby hospitals . . . .”). 
 131. See Interview with Linda Santi, supra note 111 (“They just landed 
wherever the plane dropped them which, [for me] was Salt Lake City. At times 
[it was] just trying to find out what was going on and what you had to do and 
where everybody was, was incredibly hard for people who are used to working a 
system. And for those who aren’t, it’s probably even harder—it’ll work your last 
nerve.”). 
 132. Alison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, THE DATA CTR. (Aug. 26, 
2016), https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-
impact/ (“The population of New Orleans fell from 484,674 before Katrina (April 
2000) to an estimated 230,172 after Katrina (July 2006)—a decrease of 254,502 
people and a loss of over half of the city’s population. By July of 2012, the 
population was back up to 369,250—76% of what it was in 2000.”). 
 133. Tom Dart, “New Orleans West”: Houston is home for many evacuees 10 
years after Katrina, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/25/new-orleans-west-houston-
hurricane-katrina (“[O]f the 250,000-odd evacuees who arrived in Houston after 
the storm, up to 100,000 likely stayed permanently.”). 
 134. See Dennis Devine, Katrina Survivors Touch Down in San Diego, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Sept. 5, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.sandiegounion 
tribune.com/sdut-katrina-survivors-touch-down-in-san-diego-2005sep05-story 
.html (“His wife shuddered thinking of the terrifying tide of corpses floating in 
the flood. ‘I couldn’t go back to that,’ Denise Powell said. ‘Some of them could be 
my family.’”). 
 135. Katy Reckdahl, 10 Years After Katrina, Some Are “Homeless in Their Own 
Homes,” NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 13, 2015), https://nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/2015/08/150813-homeless-after-katrina-new-orleans/ (“[T]he city has 
demolished a total of 4,106 buildings through a careful blight-abatement process, 
but tens of thousands of empty properties remain. [Angell Marie] Boutte’s 
property, for instance, has been cited for a long list of code violations involving 
rodents, high weeds, sanitation, and general neglect since April 2009. . . . Boutte 
is now facing lien foreclosure and a sheriff’s auction of her house. . . .”). 
 136. Kathy Finn, Blighted Houses Still Mar New Orleans a Decade after 
Katrina, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2015, 8:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-katrina-blight/blighted-houses-still-mar-new-orleans-a-decade-after-katrina 
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A year after Katrina, HUD also began demolishing 
public housing projects137 and other buildings. Though 
officials said they would make exceptions for lower income 
areas like the Lower Ninth Ward,138 the first Lower Ninth 
demolitions were reported in 2006.139 In 2015, 24,000 
demolition permits had been granted, and there were reports 
of owners fighting to save their homes.140 The New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority absorbed some of these properties 
and began to sell them at auction.141 
 
-idUSKCN0QS0FE20150823 (“From the hardscrabble Lower Ninth Ward to 
middle-class Gentilly, thousands of abandoned homes still litter neighborhoods 
in New Orleans, a glaring reminder of the mass exodus of residents that followed 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.”); Gillian B. White, A Housing Crisis Amid Tens of 
Thousands of Abandoned Homes, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 2015), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/new-orleans-blight-hurricane-
katrina/401843/ (“New Orleans’s abandoned houses, their entrances sealed with 
graffiti-covered plywood, are common.”). 
 137. Anne Hawke, HUD to Demolish Four New Orleans Housing Projects, NPR 
(June 8, 2006, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
5493936. 
 138. Chad Terhune, Louisiana governments threaten Katrina homes with 
demolition, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 28, 2006, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2006/08/28/Louisiana-governments-threaten 
-Katrina-homes-with-demolition/stories/200608280108 (“New Orleans already 
has exempted low-income areas such as the Lower Ninth Ward.).” 
 139. Audie Cornish, Demolition Looms for Ninth Ward of New Orleans, NPR 
(Feb. 28, 2006, 7:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=5238135; Ron Mott, New Orleans home demolitions under way, NBC NEWS (Mar. 
7, 2006, 1:37 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11712019/ns/us_news-katrina_the 
_long_road_back/t/new-orleans-home-demolitions-under-way/#.XB1n9tVKjIU 
(reporting city demolitions of houses in Lower Ninth Ward). 
 140. Lauren LaBorde, The Lens’ “Missing Home” Looks at Post-Katrina 
Demolitions, NOLA.COM (Aug. 31, 2015, 11:54 AM), https://nola.curbed.com/ 
2015/8/31/9925528/the-lens-missing-home-katrina-demolitions (“The city issued 
24,000 demolition permits since the storm, and the combination of copious FEMA 
money and fervor to remove blight resulted in a lot of knocked-down buildings.”). 
 141. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, St. Bernard Parish to Auction 151 Properties 
Bought by Road Home, NOLA.COM (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:34 PM), https:// 
www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/10/st_bernard_parish_to_auction_1_1.htm
l (“The state initially acquired about 4,464 lots in St. Bernard under the Road 
Home program from homeowners who decided not to rebuild after Hurricane 
Katrina. The Louisiana Land Trust in turn sold about half of those lots to 
neighboring property owners, in what was dubbed the Lot Next Door program.”); 
Michelle Krupa, Brisk Sales of Abandoned Properties at Recent New Orleans 
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More than a million people were displaced in the Gulf 
Coast region in the immediate aftermath of the storm, and 
up to 600,000 households remained displaced a month 
later.142 Initially, shelters took in 273,000 people, and 
eventually, FEMA trailers housed at “least 114,000 
households.”143 134,000 of New Orleanians’ housing units, 
that is, 70% of occupied domiciles, were damaged by the 
hurricane and its later flooding.144 
Damages from Katrina and the later-arrived Hurricane 
Rita, in total, reached $125 billion, not adjusted for 
inflation.145 It has been estimated that there were 1,577 
fatalities in Louisiana, “40% . . . caused by drowning[,] 
25% . . . caused by injury and trauma, and 11% caused by 
heart conditions.”146 Almost half of the dead in Louisiana 
“were people over the age of 74.”147 
By the time that Blights Out artists began to execute 
their performances and raise their billboards over a decade 
after Katrina’s landfall,148 the landscape of New Orleans had 
changed. People of color and poorer people lost their homes, 
either through abandonment or because of their inability to 
 
Redevelopment Authority Auction, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:44 PM), 
https://www.nola.com/politics/2011/04/brisk_sales_of_abandoned_prope.html 
(“Since Katrina, NORA has disposed of about 1,250 properties, with purchase 
agreements pending on about 600 more, Sathe said. In all, about 800 parcels have 
been bought by neighbors through the Lot Next Door program, which gives 
neighbors dibs on adjacent lots.”). 
 142. Alison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, THE DATA CTR (Aug. 26, 
2016), https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-
impact/. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 8, 
2019, 6:48 PM). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Blights Out began to organize and make art around property 
dispossession in New Orleans in 2014. See Blights Out: Projects, BLIGHTS OUT, 
http://www.blightsout.org/projects (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
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pay for the taxes and liens.149 As the New Orleans Housing 
Authority reported in 2016: “Broadly, areas that were 
majority African American and on lower ground before the 
storm became even more heavily African American . . . . 
Areas that were majority African American, but on high 
ground changed quickly and are now majority white or 
moving in that direction.”150 
As Carl Joe Williams, one of the members of Blights Out, 
said in an interview in January of 2019: 
[There’s a] sense of loss that’s happening here . . . . And it’s based 
on seeing the city change too much. The people who live here feeling 
a sense of helplessness of what they can do to actually hold on to 
their space and the way that it has been. So yeah, there’s a sense of 
things being taken. Here. And not just in the Lower Ninth Ward but 
the whole city. It feels like the disaster capital at its finest. There’s 
a lot of people taking advantage of the fact that people are really 
vulnerable in the city, especially the poor. And they don’t have 
maybe the resources or the game plan to combat some of the things 
that have been going on. But yeah, I feel like there’s been a sense of 
something being taken.151 
While Judge Braden, in Saint Bernard Parish I, did not 
mention “disaster capitalism,” gentrification, or address New 
Orleanians’ feelings of helplessness, she agreed, with Carl 
Joe Williams, that “something” had been “taken” from the 
people of New Orleans by the government.152 She based her 
determination on the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers, 
through its building, operation, maintenance, and failure to 
 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 150. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ASSESSMENT OF FAIR HOUSING 
TOOL 28 (2016) https://www.hano.org/home/agency_plans/AFH%20PUBLIC%20 
COMMENT%20-%20AUGUST%2019%20FINAL.pdf; Jeff Adelson, New Orleans 
segregation, racial disparity likely worsened by post-Katrina policies, report says, 
NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/new_ 
orleans/news/article_92b962f0-3866-11e8-a851-2bbb256e2f49.html 
(“Unfortunately, many policy decisions made during the recovery repeated or 
amplified existing patterns of separation and inequality.”). 
 151. Interview with Carl Joe Williams, in New Orleans, La. (Jan. 5, 2019). 
 152. Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 746 (2015). 
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maintain the MRGO had caused a temporary taking of Saint 
Bernard Parish and Lower Ninth Ward properties.153 She 
emphasized that the federal government’s construction of the 
MRGO made the region far more vulnerable to storm surges, 
and concluded that the MRGO had created a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of flooding that realized in 2005.154 
II. JUDGE BRADEN DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES’ 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS EFFECTED A TEMPORARY TAKING 
VIA THE CONSTRUCTION, EXPANSION, MAINTENANCE, AND 
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE MRGO. 
On May 1, 2015, Judge Susan Braden held that, under 
the Tucker Act,155 the United States was liable for violating 
the Fifth Amendment rights of owners of real property in 
Saint Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward of New 
Orleans.156 She determined that the U.S. Army Corps’ 
“construction, expansions, operation, and failure to 
maintain”157 the MRGO increased the “surge” of Hurricanes 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. See id. at 721 (“The fact that the Army Corps was aware that the 
construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain the MR–GO caused 
adverse environmental impacts, and that those ‘adverse impacts on the regional 
environment and ecology’ could result in substantial increased storm surge 
during hurricanes and severe storms, is well documented in this record.”). 
 155. The Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction “to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or 
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491(a)(1) (2011). To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must identify and 
plead a Constitutional provision that allots rights to money damages. See Todd 
v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 156. Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 746 (“Plaintiffs established that the 
Army Corps’ construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain the 
MR–GO caused subsequent storm surge that was exacerbated by a ‘funnel’ effect 
during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent hurricanes and severe storms, causing 
flooding on Plaintiffs’ properties that effected a temporary taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. . . .”). 
 157. Id. 
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Katrina and Rita.158 This surge flooded the plaintiffs’ 
properties, due to a “funnel effect” created by MRGO.159 
Braden held that under Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States,160 government floodings of 
properties were compensable under the Fifth Amendment as 
temporary takings, provided that the plaintiffs established 
that they owned protectable property interests under state 
law, that the character of their property and their 
“reasonable-investment backed expectations” supported the 
claim, that there was causation, and that the taking was 
substantial.161 
Judge Braden held that all of these requirements for a 
temporary taking were fulfilled, since the plaintiffs owned 
destroyed residences in Saint Bernard Parish or the Lower 
Ninth Ward,162 and so possessed investment-backed 
expectations in their property.163 She also lavished attention 
on the foreseeability of the harm threatened by the 
construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain 
the MRGO,164 which exacerbated salinity and related 
wetlands loss,165 soil erosion,166 and storm surge caused by 
the funnel effect.167 She additionally wrote about the 
warnings issued by the St. Bernard Tidal Channel Advisory 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012). 
 161. See Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719 (citing Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n, 658 U.S at 34–35). 
 162. Id. at 716. 
 163. Id. at 720. 
 164. Id. at 717. 
 165. Id. at 720. 
 166. Id. at 691. 
 167. Id. at 723. 
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Committee,168 the EPA,169 and the Army Corps’ own 
studies.170 The realization of these hazards, she concluded, 
established cause.171 It should also be noted that Judge 
Braden did discuss the role of the LPV in the storm,172 
observing that the LPV and the MRGO did not function well 
together to protect against flooding. Finally, Braden 
determined that the plaintiffs suffered “severe,” and thus 
substantial, harm to their properties, which were flooded to 
such an extent that the owners could not reach the structures 
for a “significant” period of time after Katrina and Rita.173 
“[T]he MRGO induced substantially increased storm 
surge that caused catastrophic flooding on private 
property—as well as the loss of human life,” Judge Braden 
observed when she concluded that the plaintiffs had made 
out their temporary takings claim.174 
 
 168. Id. at 698 (“On September 3, 1957, the St. Bernard Tidal Channel 
Advisory Committee convened a meeting with the Army Corps to warn that the 
MR–GO ‘will have adverse effects on the entire marsh area with consequent 
erosive action and the intrusion of high saline content water into areas normally 
fresh or only slightly [brackish].’”). 
 169. Id. at 706–07. 
 170. Id. at 700 (“By 1961, the Army Corps also was aware that larger storm 
surge could occur on the Gulf Coast, because of the shallow, broad shelf off that 
coast, and that ‘[s]torm surges may also be increased by a funneling effect in the 
converging estuaries.’”). 
 171. Id. at 738 (“For these reasons, the court has determined that Plaintiffs 
established the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction, expansions, operation, 
and failure to maintain the MR–GO caused a ‘funnel effect’ that exacerbated 
storm surge during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent hurricanes and severe 
storms.”). 
 172. She marked the ill-fit between the Barrier Plan’s structures and the 
MRGO, quoting at length from plaintiff’s expert Dr. Kemp. Id. at 737 (“[A]ll of 
the LPV structures that breached were adjacent to some part of the MRGO 
project. . . . [T]hat breaching was initiated by the excess stress applied to LPV 
structures as a result of proximity to deep channels. . . . The LPV and MRGO 
projects were never explicitly integrated with each other.”). 
 173. Id. at 746 (“There is no question that flooding on Plaintiffs’ properties 
during Hurricane Katrina was severe. In addition, Plaintiffs established that 
their properties were flooded and that they had no ability to access or use their 
properties for a significant time period following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.”). 
 174. Id. at 747. 
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III. THE REVERSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
On April 20, 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed Judge Braden.175 In a brisk, 23-page 
opinion, Judge Timothy Dyk held that Braden had erred for 
two reasons: 1) Dyk reasoned that Braden had based her 
takings analysis on government inaction, but that takings 
could only be predicated on affirmative governmental 
conduct;176 2) Dyk also held that Braden’s causation analysis 
proved fatally flawed because it only considered the ways in 
which MRGO contributed to the flooding in the Lower Ninth 
Ward and Saint Bernard Parish, without analyzing whether 
the ameliorative effects of the Barrier Plan (that is, the LPV) 
had, in fact, placed the victims in a better position overall.177 
A. Judge Dyk Determined That Governmental Takings 
Cannot Issue from “Inaction,” Which He Also Concluded 
Occurred in This Case 
The Court of Appeals’ first reason for reversing 
contained two parts: First, the Court held that Braden had 
relied upon government inaction (here, failing to maintain 
the MRGO) in her finding of a takings claim, and then it 
determined that the prevailing law on takings prevented a 
plaintiff victory on that theory. 
1. Did the government only commit an omission and not 
an affirmative act? 
Judge Dyk decided that Saint Bernard Parish I was 
reversible because Braden emphasized government 
 
 175. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 176. Id. at 1357 (“We conclude that the government cannot be liable on a 
takings theory for inaction. . . .”). 
 177. See id. (“[B]oth the plaintiffs and the Claims Court failed to apply the 
correct legal standard, which required that the causation analysis account for 
government flood control projects that reduced the risk of flooding. There was 
accordingly a failure of proof on a key legal issue. We reverse.”). 
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omission. This conclusion appears precarious, however: As 
noted above, Braden discussed the Army Corps’ 
“construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain 
the MR-GO.”178 She repeatedly emphasized positive actions: 
She established how the MRGO’s construction had been 
authorized in 1956 and built to its “full dimensions” in 
1968.179 She also noted that the government actively built 
some protection into the channel in the 1980s, though after 
a “delay” that “destroyed the banks” that would have helped 
to preserve critical levees; the results “added more fetch.”180 
 
 178. Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 738. 
 179. Id. at 691. 
 180.  
Though the Corps eventually added foreshore protection in the 1980s, 
that delay allowed the channel to widen considerably, destroying the 
banks that would have helped to protect the nearby Reach 2 levee (in the 
Chalmette Area Unit) from front-side wave attack as well as loss of 
height. The increased channel width added more fetch as well, allowing 
for a more forceful frontal wave attack on the levee. 
Id. at 692. In other ways, as well, Judge Dyk failed to acknowledge that Judge 
Braden’s analysis pivoted on affirmative government conduct. For instance, when 
taking notice of evidence the causal connection between the MRGO and increased 
salinity in the surrounding area, Judge Braden wrote: “. . . Army Corps 
documents show that salinity increased substantially in the wetlands in and 
surrounding the New Orleans Polder after the Army Corps’ construction, 
expansion, operation, and failure to maintain the MR–GO. They also show a 
significant decrease in salinity after the MR–GO was closed.” Id. at 725 
(emphasis added). 
This is only one example of Judge Braden’s focus on affirmative Army Corps 
conduct. Braden continued to use similar language throughout the opinion 
identifying the causal link between the Army Corps’ conduct and the flooding, 
specifically targeting the Corps’ “construction,” “operation,” “maintenance,” and 
“expansion” of the MRGO:  
On December 9, 2010, after Hurricane Katrina, the Army Corps issued 
a draft Environmental Impact Statement concluding that: The 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the MRGO caused the loss 
of approximately 24,610 acres and indirectly to an additional loss of 
33,920 acres. Approximately 63,178 acres of land is estimated to have 
been lost in the study area from 1985 through 2010. Approximately 
131,091 acres are projected to be lost between 2010 and 2065 within the 
study area. 
Id. at 730 (emphasis added) (stating that the combination of erosion resulting 
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Nevertheless, Judge Dyk wrote that Braden’s analysis 
was tantamount to basing liability “in large part on the 
failure of the government to take action, particularly on its 
failure to maintain MRGO or to modify it.”181 Judge Dyk also 
observed that each of Braden’s causation analyses mentioned 
a “causal link to the ‘failure to maintain’ MRGO.”182 “Thus, 
the government’s failure to properly maintain or to modify 
the banks played a significant role in plaintiffs’ takings 
theory and the Claims Court’s analysis,” Judge Dyk wrote.183 
2. Judge Dyk determined that government “inaction” 
could not give rise to a takings claim. 
Dyk engaged in disputable readings of several cases 
when determining that “inaction” could not give rise to a 
cognizable takings claim. “A property loss compensable as a 
taking only results when the asserted invasion is the direct, 
natural, or probable result of authorized government action,” 
he asserted,184 citing the 1924 Supreme Court opinion of 
Sanguinetti v. United States.185 
 
from the Army Corps’ authorized expansions and continued ship wave erosion 
played an “important role in the propagation of the astronomical tide wave and 
in the flux of more saline water from Lake Borgne/Brenton Sound into Lake 
Pontchartrain via the [INHC]”); id. at 733 (“A 2010 Army Corps draft 
environmental impact statement also reported that: Construction and 
maintenance of the MRGO caused widespread wetland loss and damages to 
estuarine habitats from the outer marshes in Breton Sound to the swamps and 
tidal fresh marsh in the western reaches of the Lake Borgne basin.”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 738 (“Plaintiffs established the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
construction, expansions, operation, and failure to maintain the MR–GO caused 
a ‘funnel effect’ that exacerbated storm surge during Hurricane Katrina and 
subsequent hurricanes and severe storms.”) (emphasis added). Thus, Braden did 
not rest her causation finding primarily or even substantially on Army Corps 
omissions, but rather identified the government’s many types of affirmative 
conduct as causes of the tragedy of 2005. 
 181. Saint Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1360 (citing Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 
Fed. Cl. at 730). 
 182. Id. at 1360 (citing Saint Bernard Par. I, 121 Fed. Cl. at 726, 729, 731, 733, 
738). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. (citing Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149–50 (1924)). 
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Does Sanguinetti require an affirmative act for a takings 
claim? That case, like Saint Bernard Parish, involved 
flooding.186 There, plaintiff’s land was close to two 
waterways, the Mormon slough and the Calaveras river.187 
These waterways, during heavy season, had been known to 
flood the plaintiff’s property, which lay between them.188 
During periods of “high water,” navigable channels would 
become unpassable, and thus Congress authorized the 
construction of a canal so that Mormon slough’s overflow 
would dump into the Calaveras river.189 Government 
engineers built the canal upon land acquired by the federal 
government.190 They placed a diversion dam in the slough to 
dispose of the material.191 They completed the canal in 1910, 
and in 1911 there was a severe flood; recurrent, lesser floods 
also occurred in all later years except for 1912 and 1913.192 
The waters invaded and injured the plaintiff’s property, and 
the plaintiff made a takings claim.193 
The Sanguinetti Court demurred. It held that, for there 
to be a taking, “it is, at least, necessary that the overflow be 
the direct result of the structure,”194 but—importantly—did 
not pivot its holding on government inaction vs. positive 
action (as Saint Bernard Parish II indicates that it did).195 
Rather, the Sanguinetti court held that such direct proofs 
could not be made because “[p]rior to the construction of the 
canal the land had been subject to the same periodical 
 
 186. Sanguinetti at 147. 
 187. Id. at 146. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 146–47. 
 190. Id. at 147. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 149. 
 195. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(citing Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149–50). 
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overflow. If the amount or severity thereof was increased by 
reason of the canal, the extent of the increase is purely 
conjectural.”196 Thus, the plaintiff’s problem in Sanguinetti 
does not skew along the lines of positive act vs. commission, 
but rather stumbled on the fact that the canal’s role in 
increasing the severity of flooding proved only speculative. 
Judge Dyk also cited the Federal Circuit’s own 2003 
decision Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States for the proposition 
that only affirmative governmental behavior, and not 
omission, could give rise to takings.197 There, the Circuit 
reversed a Court of Federal Claims determination that the 
West Virginia-based federal Post Office’s construction of a 
facility and parking lots, which plaintiffs claimed diverted 
waters onto and damaged their property, could not constitute 
a taking.198 The Ridge Line court reversed because the lower 
court had not considered “whether the increased storm 
drainage constituted a taking of a flowage easement by 
inverse condemnation.”199 Thus, Ridge Line is not a case 
where a plaintiff loses because she depended upon an 
omissions theory—instead, it holds that the lower court 
erred in failing to consider whether increased storm draining 
did constitute a taking. Judge Dyk leaned on200 Ridge Court 
because it counseled that, on remand, plaintiff’s success 
depended upon a conclusion that the taking “only 
result[ed] . . . [from] the ‘direct, natural, or probable result of 
an authorized activity and not the incidental or 
 
 196. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149. 
 197. See Saint Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1360 (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. 
United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 198. Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1350 (“[W]e vacate the trial court’s judgment and 
remand for further analysis and decision consistent with this opinion.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. While the theory that the government failed to maintain or modify a 
government constructed project may state a tort claim, it does not state a takings 
claim. A property loss is compensable as a taking only results when the asserted 
invasion is the direct, natural, or probable result of authorized government 
action. See Saint Bernard Parish II, 887 F.3d at 1360 (citing Sanguinetti, 264 
U.S. at 149–50; Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355). 
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consequential injury inflicted by the action,’” quoting a Court 
of Federal Claims case called Columbia Basin Orchard v. 
United States.201 
Columbia Basin involved the Bureau of Reclamation’s 
creation of a storage reservoir by sinking a shaft into a 
waterway west of one Orchard Lake, which stood about four 
miles away from a spring that the plaintiff used to irrigate 
his orchard.202 The water pumped from the shaft doused into 
Orchard Lake,203 and in 1940 Orchard Lake overflowed into 
the plaintiff’s spring, after two years of unusually heavy 
rainfall and snow melt.204 The lake water introduced salts 
and alkali into the spring, which the Bureau attempted to fix 
by erecting a dike around the spring,205 but this didn’t work, 
and the waters continued to be contaminated until May 
1940.206 As the Ridge Line court observed when relying on 
Columbia Basin, the Columbia Basin court cited the rule 
that “[t]o constitute a taking, the overflow of or seepage into 
the spring must have been the direct, natural or probable 
result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or 
consequential injury inflicted by the action.”207 However, just 
as in Sanguinetti, Columbia Basin did not hold that the 
takings claim failed because the government had omitted to 
act—instead, it held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove 
that the dike constituted a substantial-enough cause of the 
overflow and contamination: In lieu of the dike, the heavy 
rains were the culprit.208 Nevertheless, in Judge Dyk’s 
 
 201. Ridge Line 346 F.3d at 1355 (quoting Columbia Basin Orchard v. United 
States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709 (Ct. Cl. 1955)). 
 202. Columbia Basin Orchard, 132 F. Supp. at 708. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 709. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. (“Plainly, the discharge of this water from the Ankeny Shaft would 
not have caused Orchard Lake to overflow the spring, except for the 
unprecedented rainfall. It is, therefore, impossible to say that the flooding of the 
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opinion, Sanguinetti, Ridge Line, and Columbia Basin were 
all transformed into authorities forbidding takings claims 
where there is inaction.209 
Besides Sanguinetti, Judge Dyk also depended on two 
other Supreme Court cases, Arkansas Game & Fishing 
Commission v. United States210 and United States v. 
Sponenbarger.211 Judge Dyk characterized Arkansas Game 
as pivoting on the “affirmative actions by the government in 
releasing water from a government constructed and operated 
dam that caused downstream flooding on the plaintiff’s 
property.”212 The facts of Arkansas Game, however, are not 
that stark: the case arose because in 1948, when the Army 
Corps of Engineers constructed a dam in a management area 
owned by the Arkansas Department of Game and Fish,213 it 
also adopted a plan known as the Water Control Manual, 
which set the rates at which the Dam would release water.214 
In 1993, farmers began to complain to the Corps, which 
responded by releasing water from the Dam “at a slower rate 
than usual, providing downstream farmers with a longer 
harvest time.”215 It also extended the period in which higher 
levels of water would be released. 216 This led to downstream 
flooding in the management area during its tree growing 
season, harming the trees and the land.217 The Court 
determined that a temporary taking had been established.218 
 
spring or seepage into it, was the natural or probable consequence of the 
discharge of the waters from the shaft into the lake.”). 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 195–209. 
 210. Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 27 (2012). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 27–28. 
 216. Id. at 28. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. at 34 (“Because government-induced flooding can constitute a 
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Why? Because of “affirmative acts,” or, instead, omissions in 
the forms of failures to take care? No: There is no hard 
omissions/commissions line drawn by Arkansas Game and 
Fish. As the Court there said: 
If the Corps had released the water more rapidly in the fall of 1993, 
in accordance with the Manual and with past practice, there would 
have been short-term waves of flooding which would have receded 
quickly. The lower rate of release in the fall, however, extended the 
period of flooding well into the following spring and summer. While 
the deviation benefited farmers, it interfered with the Management 
Area’s tree-growing season.219 
As the quoted portion shows, the Corps’ acts could be 
construed as either an “affirmative act”—flooding—or failing 
to take care to prevent flooding, by failing to “release[] the 
water more rapidly in the fall of 1993.”220 
And, finally, Judge Dyk’s reliance upon the 1939 decision 
of United States v. Sponenbarger221 ignores its inapplicability 
to the facts of Saint Bernard Parish. In Sponenbarger, the 
Supreme Court declined a petitioner’s taking claim where 
her land, which rested in the alluvial valley of the 
Mississippi River, was only threatened with flooding because 
of diversions created by constructions authorized by the 
Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928.222 The Court there 
determined that “the program of improvement under the 
1928 Act had not increased the immemorial danger of 
unpredictable major floods to which respondent’s land had 
always been subject,”223 and that if petitioner did suffer 
 
taking of property, and because a taking need not be permanent to be 
compensable, our precedent indicates that government-induced flooding of 
limited duration may be compensable. No decision of this Court authorizes a 
blanket temporary-flooding exception to our Takings Clause jurisprudence, and 
we decline to create such an exception in this case.”). 
 219. Id. at 28. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 222. See United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 260 (1939). 
 223. Id. at 265.  
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flooding that was not prevented by the government’s flood 
control plan, the “Government [is not] a taker of all lands not 
fully and wholly protected. When undertaking to safeguard 
a large area from existing flood hazards, the Government 
does not owe compensation under the Fifth Amendment to 
every landowner which it fails to or cannot protect.”224 
Further, the Court observed that the petitioner only claimed 
to be at risk of greater flooding caused by the flood control 
measures, but that this had not yet come to pass. This, the 
Court said, could not constitute a taking: “[T]o hold the 
Government responsible for such floods would be to say that 
the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to pay a 
landowner for damages which may result from conjectural 
major floods . . . .”225 
Sponenbarger does not apply to the facts of 2005, because 
the floods were not conjectural,226 and the Army Corps’ 
construction, maintenance, expansion, and failure to 
maintain the MRGO caused a cluster of events that led to the 
disaster of Katrina in the form of erosion, salinity, and funnel 
effects.227 Sponenbarger involves a possible failure to save 
and a hypothetical increased risk of flooding. Neither 
scenario aligns with the devastation caused by MRGO in 
New Orleans in 2005. 
Judge Dyk’s reliance upon Sanguinetti, Ridge Line, 
Arkansas Game, and Sponenbarger for the proposition that 
governmental inaction cannot give rise to takings claims, 
then, ignores the facts of those cases and exploits the 
ambiguity of the oft-repeated test that takings require 
“authorized activity.” Is “activity” only positive conduct, or 
standing by while government-propelled disaster strikes as 
well? 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  
 226. See supra text accompanying note 87 (extremely accurate predictions).  
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 84–87. 
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As we will see in Part V, Blights Out maintains that the 
government may wrongfully deprive people of their property 
through omissions. I will engage their legal thought when 
analyzing the rectitude of Judge Dyk’s holding, while also 
addressing the ambiguities of Sanguinetti, Ridge Line, 
Arkansas Game & Fish, as well as jurisprudential 
authorities that weigh in favor of takings-by-omission. 
For the time being, however, let us turn to the next basis 
for Judge Dyk’s conclusion that Judge Braden had erred in 
Saint Bernard I: Dyk asserted that Braden had failed to 
consider the “totality of the government’s actions,”228 and 
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the government 
had not put them in a better situation than they would have 
found themselves in in the absence of any government 
conduct at all. 
B. Judge Dyk Determined that Judge Braden’s Causation 
Analysis Failed Because She Did Not Consider “the 
Totality of the Government’s Actions,” That Is, Whether 
the Ameliorative Effects of the Barrier Plan Put the 
Petitioners in a Better Position Than They Would Have 
Been Absent Any Governmental Conduct at All. 
Judge Dyk’s reversal also rested on a conviction that 
Braden had failed to consider the “totality of the 
government’s actions”229 when analyzing the takings claim, 
and that her error caused her to ignore the helpful efforts the 
government had engaged in to reduce flooding through the 
Barrier Plan.230 This oversight, Judge Dyk concluded, 
rendered her causation analysis void. 
“[T]he plaintiffs have failed to establish that the 
construction or operation of MRGO caused their injury,” Dyk 
 
 228. Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1364. 
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proclaimed.231 A valid causation analysis, Dyk concluded, 
needed to consider “‘what would have occurred’” if the 
government had not acted,232 which Dyk determined the 
plaintiffs were unable to establish since they did not want 
the Barrier Plan’s effects weighed when considering whether 
MRGO caused the flooding.233 In a striking assessment, Dyk 
held that “[t]he result is that plaintiffs failed to take account 
of other government actions . . . that mitigated the impact of 
MRGO and may well have placed the plaintiffs in a better 
position than if the government had taken no action at all.”234 
The burden for proving that the plaintiffs were not in a 
“better position” than they would have been if the 
government had simply done nothing, Dyk emphasized, 
belonged with the plaintiffs themselves.235 
Dyk continued to criticize Braden and the plaintiffs for 
only considering the MRGO’s effects “in isolation.”236 And, 
citing cases such as Arkansas Game, he specified that the 
causation analysis must consider “all government 
actions,”237 and “other government actions.”238 He 
emphasized that in Arkansas Game the Court’s causation 
analysis considered not only the deviation of the waters, but 
also the construction of the dam.239 Dyk also cited 
 
 231. Id. at 1362. 
 232. Id. (quoting United States v. Archer, 241 U.S. 119, 132 (1916)). 
 233. See id. at 1363 (“Plaintiffs on appeal are clear that in their view the LPV 
levees cannot be considered in the causation analysis.”). 
 234. Id. (emphasis added). 
 235. Id. at 1362 (“It is well established that a takings plaintiff bears the burden 
of proof to establish that the government action caused the injury.”). 
 236. See id. at 1358 (“Plaintiffs made no effort to show that the combination of 
MRGO and the LPV levees caused more flooding than would have occurred 
without any government action, arguing that the court should limit its 
consideration to MRGO in isolation.”). 
 237. Id. at 1364 (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 
1364, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 238. Id. at 1363.  
 239. Id.; see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 736 F.3d at 1372 n.2 (“[T]he 
proper comparison would be between the flooding that occurred prior to the 
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Sponenbarger, which requires that takings claimants offer 
proofs that takings occurred within a government “program 
measured in its entirety” 240—there, where the government 
“undert[ook] to safeguard a large area from existing flood 
hazards”241 through “a comprehensive ten-year program for 
the entire valley . . . .”242 
Plaintiffs, however, argued that the LPV/Barrier project 
was unrelated to the MRGO, because “the relevant beneficial 
government action must be part of the same project and that 
‘[t]he Government cannot defeat Plaintiffs’ claim by pointing 
to benefits provided by the separate LPV project.’”243 Dyk 
was not impressed by Braden’s recognition of how the LPV 
and the MRGO were never integrated with each other and 
did not function together effectively to protect against 
flood.244 Instead, he held that the Barrier Plan and the LPV 
both constituted relevant, similar governmental conduct for 
the purposes of the causation analysis, because both were 
dedicated to stem “the risk of flooding” and “avoiding flooding 
damage.”245 Thus, he held, Braden had failed to take into 
 
construction of Clearwater Dam and the flooding that occurred during the 
deviation period.”). 
 240. See Saint Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1364 (citing United States v. 
Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 266, 266–67, (2018)(emphasis added). 
 241. See Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 265 (emphasis added).  
 242. Id. at 262. Dyk also cited John B. Hardwicke Co. v. United States, 467 
F.2d 488 (Ct. Cl. 1972), where the Court of Claims considered the building of two 
dams when considering whether there was a taking. See Saint Bernard Par. II, 
887 F.3d at 1364.  
 243. Saint Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1365.  
 244. See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 
Fed. Cl. 687, 737 (2015) (“The LPV and MRGO projects were never explicitly 
integrated with each other though they occupied the same landscape. . . . [and 
that there was] no evidence that the MRGO project was ever modified to reduce 
the predictable excess surge stresses and wave attack caused by the 
encroachment of the channels on LPV structures, or, alternatively, that the LPV 
structures were bolstered in any way to withstand the obviously increasing 
threat.”).  
 245. See Saint Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1365 (“Here, there is no question 
that the LPV project was directed to decreasing the very flood risk that the 
plaintiffs allege was increased by the MRGO project. The LPV project was 
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consideration all governmental conduct related to flooding, 
that is, whether the “totality of the government’s actions 
caused the injury,” 246 and thus there remained an open 
question of whether the government had left the plaintiffs in 
a better position. 
In Part V, I show how Blights Out’s art gives us new 
information on how to construe the “totality of the 
government’s actions” as it relates to Katrina’s “flooding” 
“risk” and “damage,” which challenges Dyk’s conclusion that 
Braden’s causation analysis proved a nullity. I detail how 
Blight’s Out artists’ work makes the case that the 
government has not left the people of New Orleans better off 
than if it had not acted at all, and that this perspective 
interacts powerfully with existing law on takings causation. 
In the next Part, however, I will first attend to the 
question of how and whether Blight’s Out’s art pertains in 
any relevant way to the constitutional takings law. Based on 
existing jurisprudence, I conclude that it does. 
  
 
directly concerned with flood control; it was authorized under the Flood Control 
Act of 1965. See Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077 (1965). The LPV project 
included levees along the banks of MRGO, and the construction of the levees used 
some of the material dredged from MRGO. The levees built under the LPV project 
decreased the risk of flooding in the area, including on plaintiffs’ properties. 
Avoiding flooding damage was the very objective of the system of levees.”). 
 246. Id. 
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IV. DEMOSPRUDENCE, POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND 
COMMUNITY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
What authority grants us the right to consider the art of 
Blights Out when critiquing Judge Dyk’s opinion in Saint 
Bernard Parish II? Several precedents, happily, come to our 
aid: this Article exists in a lengthy tradition of jurisprudence 
that recognizes the role of non-lawyers in the creation of 
constitutional and other legal meaning.247 
Beginning in the 1980s, social movement scholars, legal 
anthropologists, and close observers of property “outlaws” 
and marginalized people began to incorporate alternative 
understandings of law into legal discourse. Renown popular 
constitutionalism theorists Jack Balkin,248 Reva Siegel,249 
and Robert Post250 demonstrated in the early 2000s how 
social movements—for example, the suffragist movement of 
the 19th century, the 20th century’s National Organization of 
Women’s ERA activists, and 20th century pro-life agitators—
changed interpretations of the Establishment and Equal 
Protection clauses.251 Proponents succeeded particularly 
 
 247. See infra text accompanying notes 249–72. 
 248. Professor Balkin is famous for his theories of popular constitutionalism. 
See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical 
Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 261 (2011) 
(“According to Balkin, fidelity to the Constitution requires interpreters to adhere 
to its text’s original meaning and the principles underlying that meaning. 
However, the Constitution’s original meaning and principles will regularly not 
determine the outcome of constitutional issues, making them subject to 
constitutional construction. It is in this zone of construction that popular 
constitutionalism takes over and constructs meaning.”). 
 249. Siegel, in her work with Robert Post, helps define democratic 
constitutionalism, which affirms the role of “representative government and 
mobilized citizens in enforcing the Constitution at the same time as it affirms the 
role of courts in using professional legal reason to interpret the Constitution.” See 
Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379 (2007). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id.; see also Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail 
to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 27, 57–58 (2005) [hereinafter Balkin, How Social Movements Change]; see 
also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
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where they possessed friends in “high places”252 and their 
claims did not seem “off the wall,” in Balkin’s famous 
phrasing.253 
Relatedly, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres study 
Demosprudence, the term that accounts for how social 
mobilizations can “contribute to the meaning of law.”254 In 
Guinier’s article Courting the People: Demosprudence and 
the Law/Politics Divide, Guinier cites the importance of 
“‘role-literate participants,” such as Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., who remade voting rights and accommodations law by 
leading social protests.255 Guinier and Torres also study how 
the growth of civil and constitutional rights depend upon 
“ordinary men and women on the ground,” such as the 
participants in the Freedom Summer.256 In addition, scholar 
 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 
1331 (2006) (“ERA debate guided the Court. . . .”). 
 252. Balkin, How Social Movements Change, supra note 251, at 57–58. (“To put 
it bluntly, when constitutional claims of social movements are presented before 
courts, it matters a great deal whether the movement’s representatives have 
friends in high places, and in particular, on the federal bench. The more friends 
they have, the more likely they are to win. The fewer friends they have, the more 
likely they are to lose.”). 
 253. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided,” supra note 38, at 679 
(“[C]onventions determining what is a good or bad legal argument about the 
Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change 
over time in response to changing social, political, and historical conditions.”). 
 254. Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics 
Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2009). 
 255. Id. at 550. In her groundbreaking work on dissenting opinions and 
demosprudence, Professor Guinier “offers concrete examples in which oral 
dissents apparently mobilized citizens and lent authority to their efforts at social 
change and law reform.” Linda C. McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, 
and Social Change: A Comment on Lani Guinier’s Demosprudence Through 
Dissent, 89 B.U. L. REV. 589, 590 (2009). 
 256. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a 
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2799 (2014). 
Professor Torres is recognized as co-creating the language required to recognize 
popular constitutionalism. See Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: 
How the Law, Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for 
LGBT People, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 143, 152 (2015) (“Torres and Guinier 
developed the concept of demosprudence, or the jurisprudence of social 
movements. . . .”). 
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Mark Tushnet imagines a “populist constitutional[ism]”257 
and Larry Kramer approves of popular resistance to an 
“overly assertive” Court.258 
In my own work, I have engaged the voices of community 
in an effort to understand the legal thought of 
disenfranchised people.259 I describe this as community 
constitutionalism that is of a piece with popular and 
demosprudential constitutionalism, though it embeds in 
specific communities and often focuses on unheard people, 
not charismatic leaders or social movement agitators.260 In 
this engagement, I have interviewed people in Boyle 
Heights,261 Manhattanville,262 and Detroit263 about property 
insecurity and their interpretations of the Fifth 
 
 257. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174 
(1999). Professor Tushnet is celebrated as a populist and an interdisciplinary 
scholar. See Mark A. Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on 
Populism, Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. L.J. 233, 
235 (2001) (“Professor Tushnet is celebrated in the portion of the academic 
universe inhabited by PhDs interested in constitutional development as the most 
distinguished law professor actively promoting conversations between law 
professors and members of other academic disciplines.”). 
 258. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 249 (2004). Professor Kramer is one of the most influential 
theorists of popular constitutionalism. See Michael Serota, Popular 
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1644 (2012) (“Arguably, no 
theorist has been more influential in guiding the debate than Larry Kramer.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, supra note 34, at 
125 (“I call their legal thought a form of Community Constitutionalism, and in 
the following sections, seek to introduce it to mainstream constitutional 
thought.”). 
 260. See id. at 142 (“To the extent that people in Boyle Heights did not 
broadcast their visions of takings and constitutional rights in advertised actions, 
but rather lived out these principles in their minds and in their everyday lives, 
their contributions differ from the protest models described by some of the most 
famous constitutionalists and demosprudes. . . .”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Yxta Maya Murray, Peering, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 298 
(2015). 
 263. Yxta Maya Murray, Detroit Looks Toward a Massive, Unconstitutional 
Blight Condemnation: The Optics of Eminent Domain in Motor City, 23 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 395, 400 (2016). 
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Amendment’s Takings Clause. I have also interviewed 
victims of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico about their 
understandings of Equal Protection in the wake of FEMA’s 
failures to provide adequate disaster relief to survivors 
there.264 Part of the impetus for this work is my recognition 
that people who suffer directly the loss of housing or other 
fundamental goods have a privileged understanding of the 
real-world workings of constitutional rights as they exist on 
the ground. Their community legal thought, then, should 
provide a powerful and persuasive influence on 
jurisprudence if we believe that this intimate experience 
with inequality deserves “recognition and acceptance.”265 
Importantly for this article, I have also engaged artists 
in demosprudential ventures: As one example, I have studied 
the art of Turkish-British rape survivor Tracey Emin.266 In 
Rape Trauma Syndrome and the Art of Tracey Emin, I 
analyzed Emin’s art about her rape, and its observations of 
how the state failed to support her in its aftermath, to 
leverage my case of rape law reform.267 Further, I have 
studied the protest art of Latinos in Arizona, who reacted to 
Arizona’s Latino-scapegoating Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070); I 
engaged the images used in that art in an argument against 
1070’s constitutionality.268 It is important to note that I am 
not the first to study art in the demosprudential project: 
Guinier and Torres, too, describe interactions among Latino 
farmworkers involved in Luis Valdes’s Teatro Campesino in 
 
 264. See Yxta Maya Murray, “FEMA Has Been a Nightmare::” Epistemic 
Injustice in Puerto Rico, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 321, 347–59 (2019). 
 265. Frank Michelman, Parsing “A Right to Have Rights,” 3 
CONSTELLATIONS 200, 203 (1996) (“[T]he having of rights depends on receipt of a 
special sort of social recognition and acceptance—that is, of one’s juridical status 
within some particular concrete political community.”). 
 266. Murray, Rape Trauma, supra note 36, at 1631. 
 267. Id. at 1694 (describing women’s “divorce from the state.”).  
 268. Yxta Maya Murray, Inflammatory Statehood, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & 
ETHNIC JUST. 227, 227–28, 280 (2014) (describing art and engaging the art in the 
equal protection argument). 
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their analysis of the birth and development of rights-thought 
in 1960s California.269 As this work shows, the art of 
marginalized people provides a key resource for 
constitutional interpretation, as it conveys the “buried 
experience” of marginalized people, which courts may not 
understand.270 Further, art communicates those experiences 
in ways resonant with emotion, which may contribute to 
their “intelligent and responsible engagement by law.”271 
In this Article, I study the work of Blights Out in 
relationship to the question presented in the Saint Bernard 
Parish lawsuit. This project coheres with existing traditions 
of rights jurisprudence: It “contribute[s] to the meaning of 
law”272 by offering the emotionally cathartic273 yet heretofore 
buried274 experiences of people of color who know best what 
it means to be deprived of housing in New Orleans post-
Katrina. Blights Out artists are role-literate agitators275 who 
disclose alternative interpretations of legal concepts relevant 
to Saint Bernard Parish I and II. As the reader has already 
seen, I also interweave my analysis of Blights Out’s art with 
interviews with the artists,276 as well as one New Orleans 
resident who is not an artist, nor an activist, but experienced 
 
 269. Guinier & Torres, supra note 256, at 2793, the authors describe “audience 
participation” in political theater that gave workers a “sense of agency.” This 
seems a personal processing of rights understanding. 
 270. Murray, Rape Trauma, supra note 36, at 1636.  
 271. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (2010). 
 272. Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics 
Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2009) [hereinafter Courting the People]. 
 273. Abrams & Keren, supra note 271, at 2000.  
 274. Murray, Rape Trauma, supra note 36, at 1636.  
 275. See Courting the People, supra note 272, at 550. See also Linda C. 
McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, and Social Change: A Comment on 
Lani Guinier’s Demosprudence Through Dissent, 89 B.U. L. REV. 589, 590 (2009) 
(“Professor Guinier offers concrete examples in which oral dissents apparently 
mobilized citizens and lent authority to their efforts at social change and law 
reform.”). 
 276. See, e.g., Interview with Carl Joe Williams, supra note 151. 
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the storm and its aftermath first-hand.277 
 In the next Part, I will examine Blights Out artists’ 
readings of the omission/commission distinction and the 
“totality” test cited by Judge Dyk, and see whether their 
alternative interpretations of those concepts pass the “on the 
wall” test of Jack Balkin.278 I will then see how Blights Out’s 
artistic and community jurisprudence applies to the 
quandary of whether the federal government took property 
in 2005, in the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. 
V. THE ART AND LEGAL THOUGHT OF BLIGHTS OUT 
The art-activists Imani Jacqueline Brown, Mariama 
Eversley, Byran C. Lee, Jr., Lisa Sigal, Sue Press, and Carl 
Joe Williams279 deploy a wildly creative and multi-pronged 
approach to resisting housing deprivation created by state 
forces. Their work takes a wide view of property loss. Blights 
Out argues that Katrina forms just one trauma point in a 
lengthy and wrongful redistribution of property, which the 
government promoted by both actively and passively 
supporting neoliberal forces that gentrified New Orleans 
thirteen years after the storm.280 
 
 277. See infra text accompanying note 492. 
 278. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided,” supra note 38. 
 279. See supra notes 9–13. 
 280. See infra text accompanying note 365. Blights Out is certainly not alone 
in linking Katrina to dispossession created by gentrification. In 2006, Berkeley 
City Planning graduate students Brendan Nee and Jed Horne initiated 
“NOLAplans” to provide the community links to final planning documents and to 
also collect feedback from the community about rebuilding plans post-Katrina. 
See Citywide Strategic Recovery and Rebuilding Plan, THE UNIFIED NEW 
ORLEANS PLAN, https://nolaplans.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). In their 
report City of New Orleans: 6th Ward/Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood, they write: 
“The vision starts with residents participating actively in the planning process, 
and then contributing to its success through their involvement in the physical 
improvements. A vision of rebuilding the neighborhood ‘better than it was’ brings 
concern that many in the neighborhood will be displaced through 
gentrification.”), Citywide Strategic Recovery and Rebuilding Plan, THE UNIFIED 
NEW ORLEANS PLAN, https://nolaplans.com/plans/Lambert%20Final/District_4_ 
Final_TremeLafitte6thWard.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
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Here, I will focus on four of Blights Out’s interventions, 
which include its 2014 Home Court Crawl action,281 its 2015 
Live Action Painting happening,282 and its 2016 and 2017 
“runs” for Mayor283 and President.284 These works, 
individually and together, make a causation argument and 
also characterize the appropriate “totality of government 
actions” to be considered. Respectively, Blights Out artists 
assert that the government has deprived people of color in 
New Orleans of property through acts of omission, and also 
maintains that the frame of reference for this taking includes 
not only the direct events of Katrina but also later 
government failures to protect the community against 
unfettered disaster capitalism. 
A. Home Court Crawl (2014) 
In December of 2014, Brown, Eversley, Lee, Sigal, Press, 
and Williams initiated Blights Out on the eve of the 10-year 
anniversary of Hurricane Katrina with its Home Court 
Crawl.285 This engagement involved printing text in Tyvek 
paint onto the façades of blighted properties in New 
Orleans.286 These phrases consisted of stage directions and 
lines of dialogue from Burn, one of the plays in 365 Days/ 
365 Plays, an intriguing and sprawling work by Suzanne 
Lori-Parks287 whose main purpose in its writing was to 
 
 281. See infra Section A of this Part. 
 282. See infra Section B of this Part. 
 283. See infra Section C of this Part. 
 284. See infra Section D of this Part. 
 285. Projects, Home Court Crawl, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/ 
projects (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“In December 2014, Blights Out activated 
Home Court Crawl (HCC) with a porch crawl/ roving performance . . . In 
retrospect, we see HCC as the beginning of Blights Out, despite the prior 6 
months of organizing.”). 
 286. See id. (describing materials used). 
 287. See id. (describing influence of Parks). Suzanne Lori-Parks is not a 
member of the collective. 
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“reveal community where it already exists.”288 Burn is a 
micro play, which follows the conversation of a Woman and 
a Man, who are watching an unnamed structure catch fire: 
Man: Its burning. 
Woman: Mmm. 
Man: Why didn’t you tell me? 
Woman: You didn’t smell it? 
Man:—My cold. 
Woman: I forgot. 
Man: You think it’ll burn to the ground? 
Woman: God willing. 
Man: Theyre trying pretty hard to put it out. 
Woman: And then we’ll have the ruin of it to look at. That’ll really 
suck.289 
The play ends with the lines: “The fire, in answer to their 
prayers, does pick up somewhat. But it gets put out before 
the structure can completely burn, and the rest of their lives 
are lived out in the shadow of the ruins.”290 
In Home Court Crawl, community members read these 
lines out loud in front of the blighted buildings, and also gave 
talks about blight and housing insecurity, recited poetry, and 
enjoyed communal feasting.291 In addition, a brass band 
wove through the properties, leading the community 
members in a singing and dancing variation of New Orleans’ 
famous “second line” parades,292 which are descended from 
the city’s jazz funerals and church worship.293 Web images of 
 
 288. John Moore, 365 Days . . . 365 Plays, THE DENVER POST (Nov. 10, 2006), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2006/11/10/365-days-365-plays/. 
 289. SUZANNE LORI-PARKS, 365 PLAYS/365 DAYS 141–42 (2006). 
 290. Id. at 142. 
 291. Carl Joe Williams thus described the event to me. Interview with Carl Joe 
Williams, supra note 151. 
 292. Id. See also BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 5. 
 293. See RICHARD BRENT TURNER, JAZZ RELIGION, THE SECOND LINE, AND BLACK 
NEW ORLEANS 103 (2009) (quoting Jessie Charles) (“‘Second-line—that’s the life 
of parade and a funeral . . . Dancing in Sanctified churches is like the second-
line.’ Thus the communal music, the African ancestral memory, and the trance-
inducing worship style of the Sanctified Churches influenced second-liners in jazz 
funerals in Louis Armstrong’s youth in the early twentieth century.”). 
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Home Court Crawl reveal residents drumming, shouting, 
boogeying, and declaiming amongst the destroyed 
property.294 On its website, Blights Out describes the project 
as “perform[ing] architecture” by “engaging in a call-and-
response with blighted homes, reading the architecture as 
text, riffing on the absurd state of the hollow structures, and 
energizing them with folly, rage, spirit, and joy.”295 
In this work, Blights Out describes a loss of property in 
ways that are relevant to Saint Bernard Parish. They argue 
that such dispossession was caused by government omission, 
which must be understood as unfurling not only from the 
events of Katrina296 but also from later state failures to 
prevent gentrification that led to displacement.297 The 
collective performed a funeral298 for housing and a 
community deleted by government neglect. The lines from 
Burn clarify that the government’s failures to stop the 
“burning” of Katrina and to protect the community by 
rehousing them in safe, local domiciles after the storm 
caused people’s lives to be doomed by the shadow of 
 
 294. See BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 5. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Blights Out’s case that the state must be recognized as responsible for 
Katrina’s direct effects on housing security can be found in some of its founding 
documents, though this argument is obliquely stated. Blights Out was initiated 
through process of story circles that Blights Out organized in the community, see 
BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 61 (“On August 15, 2015, members of Blights Out—
natives and newcomers—were asked to share one word to describe how they were 
feeling as the 10th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina approached . . . .). In this 
process, they connected Katrina to a host of other government-sponsored forms 
of discrimination. See id. (“Katrina, and the changes that unfolded thereafter, 
were just fireworks at the climax of a long con: Slavery. Colonialism. Segregation. 
Desegregation. Disinvestment and Urban Renewal. The Claiborne Overpass. The 
displacement of people from their homelands; the elimination of public 
transportation; the closing and privatization of neighborhood schools; the 
indefinite isolation of individuals within prison cells; in some neighborhoods—
working class neighborhoods of color, that is—one out of three businesses and 
one out of four homes linger vacant, ghostly.”). 
 297. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 298. See TURNER, supra note 293. 
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“ruin[].”299 
Furthermore, Blights Out’s artists regard many factors 
as relevant in this causation analysis. Their engagement 
emphasized not only the people’s lingering pain but also their 
persistent resistance or resilience, since they were feeding 
each other, communing with one another, dancing with one 
another, and playing each other songs in a revisionist 
funeral. This is important from the perspective of a takings 
analysis, because Home Court Crawl occurred nine years 
after Katrina, and five years after Judge Braden determined 
that the temporary taking, caused by MRGO, had ceased.300 
Home Court Crawl reveals that the taking did not just occur 
during Hurricane Katrina, but also continued to the present 
day (that is, 2014), when the people “have the ruin of it to 
look at.”301 This “ruin” consists of the ever-degrading 
properties that deprive communities of color and other 
vulnerable populations of their senses of home,302 and 
simultaneously set the stage for the ever-escalating 
 
 299. See PARKS, supra note 289. 
 300. Braden determined that the taking ceased in 2009, after the Army Corps 
closed down the MRGO. “In this case, the common question determined by the 
court was whether the Army Corps’ construction, expansions, operation, and 
failure to maintain the MR–GO caused increased storm surge flooding in St. 
Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward during Hurricane Katrina as well as 
“inevitably recurring” flooding during subsequent hurricanes and severe storms, 
effecting a temporary taking of Plaintiffs’ properties until the MR–GO was 
permanently closed in July 2009.” St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 126 
Fed. Cl. 707, 735 (2016). 
 301. See PARKS, supra note 289.  
 302. In this way, Blights Out’s takings claim rests not only on accusations of 
gentrification, but also on the government’s failure to rebuild dilapidated homes, 
which create psychological corrosion. The emotional basis of Blights Out’s takings 
argument resembles those I have seen in other communities, such as Boyle 
Heights, California, where residents complained that gentrification gave them a 
sense of anxiety and a feeling of being ‘surrounded.’ See Murray, The Taking 
Clause of Boyle Heights, supra note 162 (“A.’s description of being “surrounded” 
speaks of a fear of incipient invasion—that is, occupation. It may also qualify as 
a de facto psychological occupation of land, where the specter of gentrifiers proves 
so anxiety-producing that its influence floods into Boyle Heights and 
permanently invades it.”). 
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acquisition and gentrification that Blights Out fights.303 
Thus, the “totality” of government conduct that Blights Out 
considered relevant when analyzing wrongful property 
dispossession encompasses a plethora of government 
omissions tracking from 2005 to 2014, which have 
devastated New Orleans’ vulnerable populations. 
B. Live Action Painting (2015) 
In May of 2015, in connection with Blights Out, local 
artists Katrina Andry, Ron Bechet, Amy Bryant, Jer’Lisa 
Devezin, Keith Duncan, Horton Humble, and Varion 
Laurent set up easels in front of blighted houses in New 
Orleans’ Mid-City and Tremé neighborhoods 304 and began to 
paint them.305 All of the artists were of color,306 and the event 
went unaccompanied by any press releases or media 
notification.307 The live action painting followed the City of 
New Orleans’ decision to place houses up for auction or 
 
 303. See, e.g., BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 1. (describing “ecological apartheid”); 
see also Interview with Carl Joe Williams, supra note 151 (regarding Blights 
Out’s resistance of auctioning and gentrification); infra text accompanying note 
308; Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, St. Bernard Parish to Auction 151 Properties 
Bought By Road Home, NOLA.COM (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:34 PM), https://www.nola.com/ 
politics/index.ssf/2014/10/st_bernard_parish_to_auction_1_1.html (“The state 
initially acquired about 4,464 lots in St. Bernard under the Road Home program 
from homeowners who decided not to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina. 
The Louisiana Land Trust in turn sold about half of those lots to neighboring 
property owners, in what was dubbed the Lot Next Door program.”); see also 
Michelle Krupa, Brisk Sales Of Abandoned Properties At Recent New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority Auction, NOLA.COM (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:44 PM), 
https://www.nola.com/politics/2011/04/brisk_sales_of_abandoned_prope.html 
(“Since Katrina, NORA has disposed of about 1,250 properties, with purchase 
agreements pending on about 600 more, Sathe said. In all, about 800 parcels have 
been bought by neighbors through the Lot Next Door program, which gives 
neighbors dibs on adjacent lots.”). 
 304. See Rosemary Reyes, Connecting Intentionally: The Beginning of Blights 
Out, PELICAN BOMB (Jan. 13, 2016), http://pelicanbomb.com/art-review/2016/ 
connecting-intentionally-the-beginning-of-blights-out (giving locations). 
 305. BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 8 (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
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otherwise sell them:308 “[H]ousing rights advocates and 
neighbors alike feared that the auction would lead to a land 
grab and bloodletting of rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods 
like New Orleans’ historic 6th Ward,” Blights Out noted on 
its web page.309 The collective regarded the plein air painting 
(that is, painting outside310) as a “protest.”311 Equipped with 
their canvases, papers, charcoals, watercolors, and pencils, 
Blights Out artists quietly sketched and painted the houses 
that had been left crumbling since Katrina, and tried to 
make contact with the Sixth Ward’s changing population. 
The artist-activists felt as if their goals fell somewhat short 
on this last count, though they did engage with a local 
woman named Miss Sue. As Carl Joe Williams explained: 
Miss Sue, she was giving us water, we were right by [her house.] 
We went out there and we chose a blighted property, and we started 
making art and making drawings. It was just more of a quiet 
protest, and also an opportunity to engage with the neighbors. That 
didn’t happen so much, [but] it was cool.312 
The photographs that Blights Out took of the event show 
the artists rendering the houses mostly in black and white—
one artist, for example, drew a battered home in an 
impressionistic style,313 and another artist created a precise, 
sharp realist depiction that recalls illustration and 
 
 308. Alexander-Bloch, supra note 304; see also Michelle Krupa, supra note 304 
and accompanying text. (“Since Katrina, NORA has disposed of about 1,250 
properties, with purchase agreements pending on about 600 more, Sathe said. In 
all, about 800 parcels have been bought by neighbors through the Lot Next Door 
program, which gives neighbors dibs on adjacent lots.”). 
 309. BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 8. 
 310. Daniel Grant, Debate: Must ‘Plein Air’ Be Defined?, HUFFPOST, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/debate-must-plein-air-be-_b_7896 
29.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (“Take, for example, the term painting ‘plein 
air’ a French expression meaning ‘open air’ (and used colloquially by the French 
for camping and outdoor sports) that refers to creating a work of art outside.”). 
 311. Design as Protest, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/projects/ (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 312. Interview with Carl Joe Williams, supra note 151. 
 313. BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 8 (displaying this in the first three images of the 
photographs documenting the action). 
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architecture plans.314 The photo review of the action also 
shows the artists smiling while sitting on a broken porch that 
seems to have been wrenched away from a house’s façade,315 
and sitting together on a stoop of a dilapidated house that is 
covered with moss.316 
In this action, the Blights Out artists brought together 
two traditions, being plein air painting as well as the 
heritage of house portraits. Plein air painting rose as a 
favored form in late 18th century France, and artists prized 
it for its ability to convey facts or “truth,”317 in a variety of 
contested forms. It has been associated with, for example, the 
Enlightenment obsession with natural science and the 
precise study and rendering of nature,318 passions that led to 
sometimes distressing collections of “specimens” and even 
racist forms of taxonomy.319 Painters such as Corot and 
Manet also affiliated plein air painting with “authenticity 
that [could be expressed] . . . with a direct and spontaneous 
painting technique, as opposed to the ‘lèche’ (licked, highly 
polished) finish associated with official academic 
painting.”320 
 
 314. Id. (pictures 4 & 5). 
 315. Id. (picture 6). 
 316. Id. (picture 7). 
 317. These are my own scare quotes, since disclosures of “truth” by 
documentary methods in the 18th century were horrifying racist exercises. See, 
e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried: Carrie 
Mae Weems’ Challenge to the Harvard Archive, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 
1, 18 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened] (describing 
Georges Cuvier’s 1815 dissection of Sarah Baartman). 
 318. ANTHEA CALLEN, THE WORK OF ART: PLEIN AIR PAINTING AND ARTISTIC 
IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 11 (2015) (“[I]t has been linked to the 
growing metropolitan Enlightenment concern for natural science, natura 
naturans, and the accurate observation of nature. The eighteenth century 
passion for collecting and cataloguing natural phenomenon from flora to fauna to 
geological specimens, for a naturalist Linnean taxonomy, has parallel, too, in the 
plein-air artists’ records of nature.”). 
 319. See Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened, supra note 317, at 14 n.80. 
 320. CALLEN, supra note 318, at 13. 
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The history of home portraits can also be traced to at 
least the 18th century, when English nobles commissioned 
artists to paint their great houses in order to convey their 
own personal status and grandeur. As art historian Linda 
Chisolm writes, the house became the “symbol and measure 
of position. The larger and more impressive the house, the 
greater the esteem in which the owner was held. Artists were 
commissioned to paint the great houses in the most flattering 
light, as they did in portraits of people.”321 So, for example, 
Richard Wilson painted an idealized Wilton House for Henry, 
Earl of Pembroke in 1750,322 and John Constable rendered 
an exquisite Malvern Hall for Henry Greswolde Lewis in 
1820. 
Blights Out’s May 2015 action engaged this history and 
flipped it on its head: once the subject of racist taxonomy and 
investigative science, Black people now looked at the world 
around them to see what was authentic—loss, destruction—
and marked it down on paper and canvas. And while house 
portraits once functioned as high-status signaling, these 
house portraits sought to make a record of the continuing 
effects of Katrina. The artists also documented how 
dispossession had begun to take the form of gentrification, 
which caused the neighborhood to be populated by people 
who did not want to engage with the artists (as Carl Joe 
Williams said, “that didn’t happen so much” except for Miss 
Sue).323 The portraits also reveal the violence of the 
redistribution of property, since the scars and battery of the 
flood, as well as the erosion caused by time, are visible on the 
façades of the homes. 
What does this all mean for Saint Bernard Parish? 
Again, the appellate court reversed Braden based on the 
 
 321. LINDA CHISOLM, THE HISTORY OF LANDSCAPE DESIGN IN 100 GARDENS 142 
(2018). 
 322. JEREMY BLACK, CULTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: A SUBJECT 
FOR TASTE 55 (2007). 
 323. Interview with Carl Joe Williams, supra note 151. 
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issues of omission and causation.324 Regarding omission, like 
Home Court Crawl, Live Action Painting shows that the 
government’s failure to take action on blight and 
gentrification commits terrible harms on communities of 
color: The action documents the stricken bodies of the 
houses, and the artists’ failed interactions with invisible new 
neighbors, to show the community “ruin” complained of in 
Home Court Crawl—that is, dispossession, or “taking” in 
Fifth Amendment parlance. Blight, auctioning, home loss, 
and frosty newcomers have crept into New Orleans because 
of the government’s failure to care for its vulnerable 
populations extending from 2005 to 2015, the date of Live 
Action Painting. 
Regarding “the totality of the government action[s]” 
argument, again, like Home Court Crawl, Live Action 
Painting reveals that the relevant scope of the government’s 
behavior does not just boil down to the building and failure 
to maintain MRGO,325 or its construction of the LPV.326 
Instead, Blights Out shows that the property deprivation has 
remained a continual morphing process, which first took the 
form of the flood, and then shifted into a blight-creating 
diaspora, auctioning, and demographic tilt away from lower 
income people of color. For Blights Out, the “totality of the 
government’s actions” encompasses events that reach back 




 324. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354, 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 325. See id. at 1365. 
 326. Id. 
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C. The Political Campaigns 
In November 2016, Blights Out “Ran For President,” and 
in 2018 it “Ran For Mayor.” These actions involved a multi-
platformed approach. First, back in 2015, the collective 
began to gather stories from the community using “story 
circles,” which they held in a Black-owned local bookstore on 
the eve of the ten-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina.327 
As Mariama Eversley explained to me in a conversation we 
conducted on November 10, 2017 in the 6th Ward: “[We seek 
to] stoke the imaginary, the imaginary of citizens—what 
would it look like if ordinary people’s lived experiences were 
made into policies and the slogans themselves were 
[gathered from] story circles? . . . Story circles [are] an 
ancient way of communicating in New Orleans.”328 
Through these story circles, Blights Out gathered 
leitmotifs and legends with which they later populated their 
campaigns’ lawn signs and billboards.329 As with the 
previous actions, these campaigns argue that the 
government has committed property dispossession through 
acts of omission, and that the relevant “totality of the 
government’s actions” to be considered in this analysis 
should be understood as stemming from at least 2005 to the 
 
 327. Interview with Mariama Eversley, Blights Out, in New Orleans, La. (Nov. 
10, 2017); see also BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 6. (“On August 15, 2015, members of 
Blights Out—natives and newcomers—were asked to share one word to describe 
how they were feeling as the 10th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina approached. 
Dueling, conflicting, entwined emotions about the future were exposed: fear and 
anxiety tempered with optimism and hope. These single words sparked a 
profound conversation about what it means to belong to and become part of a 
place and a community.”). 
 328. Interview with Mariama Eversley, supra note 327; see also JOHN 
FLAHERTY, FLOODLINES: COMMUNITY AND RESISTANCE FROM KATRINA TO THE JENA 
SIX 21 (2010) (“One of the key features of New Orleans organizing is the story 
circle—a process whereby people communicate and come together by telling 
personal stories on a theme. Story circles were developed by the Free Southern 
Theatre (FST), which formed out of SNCC and Freedom Summer in the mid-’60s 
as the theatrical branch of the civil rights movement.”). 
 329. Mariama Eversley explained this to me in our interview. See Interview 
with Mariama Eversley, supra note 327.  
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current, gentrified, moment. 
1. Blights Out for President 
In November of 2016, Blights Out artists distributed 
lawn signs and two billboards featuring the slogans its 
members had collected during the story cycle process.330 “As 
they reported on their webpage, they did so in order to 
metaphorically saturate the city beginning on the eve of the 
November 8, 2016 election and into the future because civic 
engagement does not end at the ballot.”331 
The slogans read as follows: 
“The People” for President 
Development Without Displacement 
Commodified Housing is Class Warfare 
50 Years Later, We Still Need “Decent Housing Fit for Human 
Beings” 
Look Me In the Eye 
Trauma Is Planned into Architecture/Resistance Is Developed In 
People332 
Together, these slogans communicated three messages 
relevant to the Saint Bernard’s Parish analysis. First, “‘The 
People’ For President” sign verified that Blights Out intends 
to become a part of the federal political conversation about 
Katrina, housing, and rights, and to put the people’s voices 
at the forefront of the agenda. This relates to Blights Out’s 
place within demosprudence, as it stakes a claim as an 
artistic and social movement that “does not end at the 
ballot.”333 Blights Out seeks to create cultural, social, and 
political change in the same way as did the social movement 
agents studied by the likes of Reva Siegel, Robert Post, Jack 
 
 330. BLIGHTS OUT, supra note 7. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
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M. Balkin, Lani Guinier, Gerald Torres, and other scholars, 
and so features within this pantheon of change agents in 
political and possibly also constitutional arenas.334 
Second, the Blights Out for President campaign 
continues Blights Out’s onslaught on the omission/ 
commission distinction with its “50 Years Later, We Still 
Need ‘Decent Housing Fit for Human Beings’” sign. This 
slogan refers to item # 4 of the famous manifesto, What We 
Want/What We Believe, written for the Black Panther Party 
by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale in 1966.335 Along with calls 
for freedom, education, self-determination, and 
employment,336 the Panthers’ “Platform and Program” 
asserted that: 
We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings. 
We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing 
to our black community, then the housing and the land should be 
made into cooperatives so that our community, with government 
aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.337 
The Panthers demanded fit housing during the Great 
Migration, which saw the exodus of millions of African 
Americans from the South toward the North beginning in 
1916.338 The members of this diaspora encountered housing 
discrimination, which led to the “creation of African 
American slums in the most distressed urban areas of the 
country.”339 The Panthers thus called upon the “government” 
 
 334. See supra text accompanying notes 248–271. 
 335. See What We Want Now! What We Believe, 24 THE BLACK PANTHER at 3. 
 336. See id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 
1960: PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 27 (2005) (dating the Great Migration 
between 1910 and 1970); Isabel Wilkerson, The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great 
Migration, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag 
.com/history/long-lasting-legacy-great-migration-180960118/ (“The migration 
began, like the flap of a sea gull’s wings, as a rivulet of black families escaping 
Selma, Alabama, in the winter of 1916.”). 
 339. Lamb, supra note 338, at 28. 
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to provide “aid” so that Black people could live in housing 
that—by implication—was designed for subhumans. In other 
words, the Panthers saw it as the government’s 
responsibility to affirmatively create decent housing options 
for Black people, or to be held accountable for sheltering 
human beings in “[in]decent” structures. As Newton told a 
Rolling Stone reporter in 1972, “You can tell the tree by the 
fruit it bears. You see it through what the organization is 
delivering as far as a concrete program. If the tree’s fruit 
sours or grows brackish, then the time has come to chop it 
down—bury it and walk over it and plant new seeds.”340 
When Blights Out quotes the Black Panthers’ manifesto, 
then, it also carries forward the Panthers’ theory of 
causation, which finds no meaningful distinction between 
omission and commission when it comes to government 
behaviors that hurt Black people—the Panther manifesto 
calls for the government to cease its failure to provide decent 
housing by rendering “aid.” The Panthers’ and Blights Out’s 
rejection of the omission/commission distinction rests in the 
understanding that the key element is not acts or failures to 
act, but the harm produced by government behavior: The 
“fruit it bears.” As with the Home Court Crawl and Live 
Action Painting, then, Blights Out’s legal thought rejects 
Judge Dyk’s omission/commission distinction because New 
Orleans’ communities of color and vulnerable populations 
are hurt by property dispossession regardless of whether a 
positive act or failure to care occurs. 
Third, Blights Out once again adds to our understanding 
of the “totality of the government’s actions” that we should 
consider when studying the question of whether and how the 
government took property from people in New Orleans. Their 
comprehension of this totality is so wide that it also connects 
with the rejection of an omission/commission distinction: In 
 
 340. Tim Findley, Huey Newton: Twenty-Five Floors From the Street, ROLLING 
STONE (Aug. 3, 1972), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/huey-
newton-twenty-five-floors-from-the-street-176820/. 
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the signs “Development Without Displacement,” “Trauma is 
Planned into Architecture,” and “Look Me In the Eye,” 
Blights Out artists show that dispossession associated with 
Katrina did not just emanate from the flood, the MRGO, or 
the building of the LPV, but extends to a much wider window 
of events. As before, these include the government-permitted 
redevelopment and redistribution efforts that followed the 
devastation. Not only did the Army Corps’ building of the 
MRGO separate people from their homes, but the public 
auctioning and resulting private development that followed 
the scourge displaced them and traumatized them to such a 
degree that they left, became homeless, or felt homeless341 
because they are subjected to “Class Warfare” and 
newcomers (as in the case of Live Action Painting342) who will 
not “Look [them] in the Eye.” As Imani Jacqueline Brown 
explained to me during an interview in 2017: 
Look me in the eye means if you walk down the street, if you meet 
my eye, you have to. And if you do, you have to acknowledge 
[people’s] . . . humanity, even if it’s just a smile or to say hello, say 
how are you doing? All right? And there is a special contract that 
everyone buys into just by being in this place. And we’ve seen it 
break down, when people don’t speak to each other and 
acknowledge each other’s humanities. And it hurts and it’s an 
attack.343 
“Look Me in the Eye,” then, signifies that the change in 
the community that has followed the displacement of 
development has also led a particular dispossession of Black 
residents—that of being seen as human within New Orleans 
because of housing displacements, demographic shifts, and 
racism and classism. This, along with the language of 
warfare, trauma, dispossession, and the Black Panther’s 
accusations of “unfitness,” designates that, when looked at in 
 
 341. On this last point regarding emotions and takings, see supra note 302. 
 342. See supra text accompanying note 312 (Carl Joe Williams’ thoughts on the 
new neighbors). 
 343. Telephone Interview with Imani Jacqueline Brown, Co-founder, Blights 
Out (June 8, 2017). 
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its totality, both the Army Corps of Engineers’ building of the 
MRGO, as well as a host of other government behaviors, 
including its permissions of sales and gentrification, has 
taken property from the people of New Orleans. 
2. Blights Out for Mayor 
In 2018, Blights Out “Ran for Mayor” of New Orleans by 
setting up a twelve billboards at the corner of Orleans Street 
and Galvez Avenue in the Tremé District,344 offering citizens 
a selection of five lawn signs, 345 and posting a video.346 In 
their web announcement, Blights Out announced that it 
sought a “post-Katrina Truth and Reconciliation process. We 
seek the redress of policies and values imposed in the wake 
of disaster that reinforce ecological apartheid in our housing 
landscape and that threaten to turn our city into a gentrified 
fortress that shelters the wealthiest from the rising-up of 
seas and people.”347 
In this action, Blights Out reiterates and reinforces its 
arguments that its art is a form of legal thought. This art-
jurisprudence holds that omissions cannot be meaningfully 
distinguished from commissions, and that the “totality of the 
government’s actions” to be considered in regard to land 
dispossession must extend far beyond the MRGO and the 
building of the LPV wall. In analyzing these features of 
Blights Out’s legal theory, I will study three of Blights Out’s 
Mayoral billboards, being its “Blights Out For Mayor,” 
“October,” and “Disaster Capitalism” presentations. 
  
 
 344. See Blights Out For Mayor, BLIGHTS OUT, http://www.blightsout.org/ 
mayor (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). For verification of the location, see this video 
identifying Galvez and Orleans as being in the Tremé and flooded by another 
storm in 2017. See WWLTV, Flooding In Treme Restaurant On Orleans and 
Galvez, YOUTUBE (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oC6E1_ 
8C6fU. 
 345. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
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a. Blights Out offers its art as a form of legal thought by 
“running for Mayor” and invoking Article VII, Section 25 of 
the Louisiana Constitution 
As in the case of its “Blights Out for President” 
campaign,348 Blights Out staked its claim as a generator of 
legal thought by running for Mayor in 2018. It announced its 
intention to “run” both in its web statements349 as well as in 
a black and white, flag-shaped billboard that read: “Blights 
Out / For Mayor. / For New Orleans. / For America.” / 
Development Without Displacement / #puthousingfirst.”350 
I call this the “Blights Out For Mayor” billboard. 
In making this declaration, Blights Out artists imagined 
themselves as an aspiring executive distributor of legal 
rights and remedies. And, just as they criticized the federal 
approach to land justice in its Presidential campaign, here 
Blights Out critiques not only federal (as it seeks to become 
the Mayor for “America”) but also local and state policies (it 
simultaneously stumps to become Mayor of “New Orleans”) 
that have wrested people of color from housing in the days 
since 2005. 
Blights Out also makes a specific legal argument in its 
invocation of Article VII, Section 25 of the Louisiana 
Constitution, which it deploys in (what I will call) its 
“Louisiana Constitution” billboard.351 The billboard quotes 
the provision, which reads in part: “The legislature may 
postpone the payment of taxes, but only in cases of overflow, 
general conflagration, general crop destruction, or other 
public calamity. . . .”352 Blights Out then also offers a 
dictionary-like definition of “housing crisis” as a “public 
calamity.”353 Section 25 has since been codified and permits 
 
 348. See supra notes 331–44. 
 349. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
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 352. Id. (emphasis in original).  
 353. Id. 
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tax debtors who reside in a declared emergency zone to 
request postponement of their ad valorem taxes.354 
Blights Out leave nebulous whether the judiciary should 
declare a state of housing emergency under the 
constitutional provision, whether the “Mayor of America” 
should do so, or whether the “Mayor of New Orleans” should 
take up this mantle. But, regardless of where this legal 
authority arises from, Blights Out seeks more than tax 
liability postponement under the Louisiana Constitution: In 
the billboard, it demands “Forgive[ness] for all Katrina-
related debt from taxes and liens.” 
Blights Out thus engages the language of the law to 
argue for forgiveness of taxes and liens, in order to bring 
about its stated goal of “post-Katrina” “truth and 
reconciliation” and “redress” for a housing crisis that has 
stripped locals of their homes. While its citation to the 
Louisiana Constitution depends upon a different legal theory 
than that of Fifth Amendment takings, Blights Out 
nevertheless announces that it seeks to have its art 
recognized as a mode of legal thought. It thus places itself 
well within the tradition of popular constitutionalism and 
the law-changing social movements described by Reva 




 354. The Louisiana legislature codified this provision in La. Stat. Ann. 
§ 47:2130 (2009). Under this statute, where an emergency is declared, a tax 
debtor may “request the postponement of the payment of ad valorem taxes on his 
property . . . .” 
 355. See supra notes 248–256. 
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b. Blights Out argues that no meaningful distinction between 
omission and commission exists, as those concepts pertain to 
housing dispossession post-Katrina 
In its “October” billboard,356 Blights Out displayed the 
above-mentioned357 image and text designed by illustrator 
Hannah Chalew.358 The sign depicted a black-and-white 
drawing of a dilapidated home and the text: Ecological 
apartheid (spatial segregation) is already etched into our 
housing landscape. Will our future city be a gentrified fortress 
designed to protect the wealthy from the rising-up of seas and 
people? A black-and-white caption crowned the spectacle: 
#TellYourMayor / We Demand / Truth and Reconciliation 
/ On Gentrification. 
As in the case of Home Court Crawl, Live Action 
Painting, and 50 Years Later, We Still Need “Decent Housing 
Fit for Human Beings”, Blights Out rejects any 
omission/commission distinction regarding levying 
responsibility for housing and home dispossession. The 
billboard communicates the devastating impacts that the 
government’s behavior has imposed upon the people pre- and 
post-Katrina, by showing the image of a shattered and moss-
infected domicile. It calls this devastation “apartheid,” 
signaling the extremity of the deprivation and its racial 
meaning,359 and uses the passive voice—“is already 
etched”—to reveal a disinterest in the precise gestures 
(omission or commission) that led to this end. Moreover, 
government responsibility exists regardless of who 
 
 356. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. Few of the billboards have 
been temporarily marked on the Blights Out website, but this one appears with 
an “October” designation. Id. 
 357. See id. (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 358. See id. (citing Chalew as the illustrator). 
 359. The etymology of apartheid exposes the word’s wrenching origins: see, 
Apartheid, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word 
/apartheid (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“apartheid (n.) . . . segregation of European 
from non-European people, from Afrikaans apartheid (1929 in a South African 
socio-political context), literally ‘separateness,’ from Dutch apart ’separate’ (from 
French àpart; see apart) + suffix -heid, which is cognate with English -hood.”). 
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affirmatively “designs” the “gentrified fortress” that will 
grow from the wastage of Katrina, as the “architect[]” is not 
named. 
Further, and critically, Blights Out invokes the doctrine 
of “Truth and Reconciliation” as its preferred form of redress. 
South African officials work to address the national crime 
and trauma of apartheid through Truth and Reconciliation 
processes; Blights Out references this history and practice in 
its sign.360 Truth and Reconciliation undertakings permit 
communities to “construct a shared understanding of right 
and wrong by engaging in dialogue,”361 and thus develop 
understandings of harm and trauma through group sourced 
narratives that are conscious of race and class dynamics, not 
through top-down binaries such as the omission/commission 
construct created by Judge Dyk.362 Moreover, these 
communities understand that those who have committed the 
sins of omission may be just as guilty as active participants 
in such a crime. For example, Pumla Gobodo-Mdikizela, a 
participant in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
process,363 calls bystanders “beneficiaries,” and emphasizes 
that they must be part of the justice process: 
[F]or a true transformation to take place in South African society, 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders alike must acknowledge the 
past. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s public process 
 
 360. See, e.g., CLAIRE MOON NARRATING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION: SOUTH 
AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 38 (2009) (describing the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Committee’s work from November of 1995 to 
October of 1998, “taking testimonies from victims and perpetrators in regional 
‘courts’ for the period of around thirty-three years under scrutiny, from March 
1960 to December 1993.”). 
 361. Emily B. Mawhinney, Restoring Justice: Lessons from Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa and Rwanda, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 21, 
25 (2015). 
 362. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 363. JILL EDELSTEIN, TRUTH AND LIES: STORIES FROM THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 25 (2002) (quoting Gobodo-
Mdikizela as saying, “in 1996, when I was invited to join the truth and 
Reconciliation Commission”). 
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was an opportunity to examine these complex roles both at 
individual and collective levels . . . But many beneficiaries of 
apartheid privilege have responded to the call to public 
accountability with silence . . . . Reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators is not enough. For social transformation to take place, 
reconciliation has to be between victims and beneficiaries.364 
When Blights Out cites the Truth and Reconciliation 
process, then, it connects with a justice system that 
emphasizes trauma, impact, and White supremacy in 
determining the meaning of an individual or government act. 
As Gobodo-Mdikizela shows us, that process regards failures 
to aid or intervene as meaningfully destructive behaviors, in 
contrast to the approach of Judge Dyk. 
c. Disaster Capitalism and the totality of the government’s 
actions 
Blights Out looks at a wide span of government and 
neoliberal behaviors to account for wrongful home 
dispossession during and after Katrina.365 Like in the cases 
of Home Court Crawl, Live Action Painting, Development 
Without Displacement, and Trauma is Planned into 
Architecture, the November billboard “Disaster Capitalism” 
finds fault in government inaction in the face of post-Katrina 
property redistribution. The November billboard makes 
specific reference, of course, to the concept of disaster 
capitalism coined by Naomi Klein in her 2007 book THE 
SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM, where 
she excoriates “orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the 
wake of catastrophic events combined with the treatment of 
disasters as exciting market opportunities,”366 and 
specifically cites government support of freewheeling private 
enterprise that now transforms Katrina.367 Blights Out 
 
 364. Id. at 31. 
 365. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 366–368. 
 366. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 6 
(1st ed. 2007). 
 367. See id. at 8. 
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offers its own gloss on Katrina-related disaster capitalism in 
its billboard, which reads: “Disaster Capitalism . . . : The 
practice (by a government, regime, etc.) of taking advantage 
of a major disaster to push the poor out of the inner city and 
turn every public service into an opportunity for profit by the 
already wealthy.”368 
The relevant totality of the government’s actions here, 
then, would encompass not only the government’s 
affirmative efforts to bar people from their homes in the 
direct aftermath of the storm (“push the poor out of the inner 
city”)369 but also its status as a bystander or (in Pumla 
Gobodo-Mdikizela’s phrasing) “beneficiar[y]”370 that 
conspired with neoliberal agents to offer up the city and its 
services to the “already wealthy.”371 Thus, once again, 
Blights Out emphasizes that the window for the totality of 
circumstances to be considered in the study of housing 
dispossession extends far beyond the circumstances of the 
storm. 
VI. BLIGHTS OUT’S LEGAL THOUGHT AS IT APPLIES TO 
SAINT BERNARD PARISH II 
Through their installations, Blights Out artists make 
several arguments that have jurisprudential application to 
Saint Bernard Parish II. First, Blights Out artists argue that 
government forces have wrongfully dispossessed New 
Orleanians of their homes. They argue this by holding a 
funeral for their housing,372 referencing being “push[ed] . . . 
out,”373 asserting that they are being forced into 
“apartheid,”374 drawing memorial paintings of blighted 
 
 368. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
 369. See EDELSTEIN, supra note 363, at 31. 
 370. See supra note 364. 
 371. Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
 372. See supra note 292. 
 373. Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
 374. See supra note 1. 
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houses,375 and citing the Black Panthers’ accusation that the 
government has failed to provide Black people decent 
housing fit for human beings.376 They allege that this 
deprivation has occurred in violation of a rule of law that 
they represent and brandish by their imaginary inhabitation 
of Presidential and Mayoral candidacies,377 citation to the 
Louisiana Constitution,378 and reference to the justice 
process known as Truth and Reconciliation.379 Applying 
these commitments to the context of Saint Bernard Parish 
II, then, Blights Out would disagree with Judge Dyk’s 
conclusion that the government has not been proven to have 
taken property through its conduct surrounding Katrina. 
Second, Blights Out artists find that this taking occurs 
in the wake of government omission. As noted, Home Court 
Crawl, Live Action Painting, and the two political campaigns 
all emphasize repeatedly that government inaction has left 
poor people of color to look upon “ruin,”380 upended their 
communities,381 and left them without housing fit for human 
beings.382 
Third, when examining the “totality of the government’s 
action” to gauge the scope of this taking, Blights Out artists 
do not focus only on government’s conduct in the immediacy 
and direct aftermath of the flood, but look at a wide window 
of events that include later backing of market forces that 
exclude Black people from their neighborhoods and city.383 
The questions that follow include whether these aspects 
 
 375. See supra note 313. 
 376. See Blights Out for President, supra note 7. 
 377. See id.; Blights Out for Mayor, supra note 344. 
 378. See Blights Out for Mayor, supra note 344. 
 379. See MOON, supra note 360. 
 380. See LORI-PARKS, supra note 289 at 182. 
 381. See Blights Out for Mayor, supra note 344. 
 382. See Blights Out for President, supra note 7. 
 383. See, e.g., supra note 326. 
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of Blights Out’s legal thought prove sufficiently legitimate 
that they may be applied to the question presented in Saint 
Bernard Parish. Recall that Jack Balkin’s influential tests of 
the feasibility of popular constitutionalism relied upon social 
movement actors having “friends in high places” and 
ensuring that their claims are “on the wall.”384 Thus, we 
must consider the extent to which Blights Out and its claims 
pass those tests. And, if they do, we must contemplate how 
they influence the takings claim analysis in Saint Bernard 
Parish. 
A. Does Blights Out Have Friends in High Places? 
Jack Balkin specifies that “friends in high places” means 
judges on the federal bench.385 Blights Out possesses no such 
friends as of yet.386 However, we can strike new territory in 
popular or community constitutionalism by recognizing the 
esteem of many different types of friends. Blights Out may 
not have judges in their pockets, but they do draw strength 
and influence from their community. 
 
 384. See, e.g., Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided,” supra note 38, at 679 
(suggesting that “conventions determining what is a good or bad legal argument 
about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ 
change over time in response to changing social, political, and historical 
conditions.”). 
 385. Balkin, How Social Movements Change, supra note 251, at 58.  
 386. A search of Westlaw evidences 0 references to Blights Out. This is contrast 
to the #metoo movement, which as of February 1, 2019, evidences 7 references to 
#metoo, some supportive, and some not so much. Compare the remarkable United 
States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2017) (“Any 
injustice rankles Americans, systemic injustice rankles them profoundly. Those 
of us who occupy the constitutional offices of the United States—in whatever 
branch we serve—must humbly acknowledge that there exists in America today 
a deep and pervasive sense of injustice.” (citing Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of 
# MeToo, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/)), with Chlad v. 
Chapman, No. 17 C 5198, 2018 WL 4144627, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2018) 
(“[Petitioner] goes on to chide the court for being tone deaf to the 
#metoo movement and concludes that the absence of any discussion about her 
abuse “is indicative in-and-of-itself of the reversible, flawed reasoning” in the 
judge’s opinion . . . . This argument is meritless.”). 
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Blights Out’s merit has been recognized by journalists 
writing for NextCity, The Miami Herald, The Gambit, 
Pelican Bomb, Art.Sy,387 and NOLA.com.388 Its 
organizational partners are Antenna, National Organization 
of Minority Architects (NOMA), Junebug Productions, 
HousingNOLA, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center (GNOFHAC), Ole & Nu Style Fellas Social Aid and 
Pleasure Club, RAO Real Estate Advisory, Justice and 
Beyond Coalition, Crescent City Community Land Trust 
(CCCLT), Newcomb Art Museum at Tulane University, May 
Gallery & Residency, NEXT City, New Orleans Master 
Crafts Guild, Hidden History Tours, and Loyola Law School 
Human Rights Clinic.389 Blights Out artists have been 
awarded grants and fellowships by Creative Capital and the 
Joan Mitchell Foundation.390 Further, artists such as the 
superstar Glenn Ligon391 and MacArthur “Genius” Grant 
and Ford Foundation Fellowship winner Fred Wilson392 have 
contributed to the collective’s “Blights Out for Mayor” 
Kickstarter campaign.393 
Further, it is a hope of mine that, in writing of Blights 
Out’s work, and publishing this account in this law review, 
that I may introduce this arts collective to a legal community 
 
 387. See Press, BLIGHTSOUT.ORG, http://www.blightsout.org/press/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2019). 
 388. Doug MacCash, Prospect.3 ‘Home Court Crawl’ blends theater and 
blighted architecture on Saturday, Dec. 13, NOLA.COM (Dec. 10, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.nola.com/arts/index.ssf/2014/12/prospect3_home_court_crawl_com.
html. 
 389. About, BLIGHTSOUT.ORG, http://www.blightsout.org/about/ (last visited, 
Nov. 9, 2019). 
 390. See Home, BLIGHTSOUT.ORG, http://www.blightsout.org/home/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2019). 
 391. See Glenn Ligon, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/ 
artist/glenn-ligon (last visited, Nov. 9, 2019). 
 392. See Fred Wilson, FORD FOUNDATION, https://www.fordfoundation.org/ 
campaigns/the-art-of-change-meet-our-fellows/fred-wilson/ (last visited Nov. 9, 
2019). 
 393. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
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filled with academics, lawyers, judges, students, and 
legislators who may become eventually their friends in high 
places. Such is the cherished hope of many who dedicate 
themselves to writing legal scholarship. 
B. Is the Claim That the Federal Government Took Property 
through Its Conduct During and after Katrina on the 
Wall? 
Judge Braden determined that the Army Corps’ 
construction, expansion, maintenance, and failure to 
maintain the MRGO caused the flooding and destruction of 
homes that constituted a temporary taking under Arkansas 
Game & Fish.394 Since Braden is a federal judge, this 
establishes that the basic claim that takings occurred as a 
result of federal failures to care in connection with Hurricane 
Katrina are not outside the window of legal plausibility. 
Thus, Blights Out’s essential case that the government has 
taken their property qualifies as cognizable, 
demosprudential legal thought, which offers a cogent 
critique of Judge Dyk’s conclusions in Saint Bernard II. 
But do the foundations of its takings claim pass muster? 
Blights Out’s conclusion that an impermissible taking has 
occurred rests upon the two grounds that I have recognized 
in this Article. Again, Blights Out artists 1) recognize 
takings that are accomplished through government 
omission; and 2) expand the “totality of the government’s 
actions” to include a much wider window of events than 
merely the building or maintaining of the MRGO and LPV. 
In the following sub-sections I will see whether these 
claims qualify as on the wall according to existing Fifth 
Amendment law or property theory. 
1. Is the claim that the takings were accomplished 
through federal failures to care off the wall? 
 
 394. See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 
Fed. Cl. 687, 690 (2015). 
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As discussed in Part II, Judge Braden insisted that the 
Army Corp temporarily took property in Saint Bernard 
Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward because of its positive acts 
(in the forms of building and maintaining);395 she also 
mentioned that the Army Corps failed to maintain the 
MRGO.396 While Braden mentioned plenty of commissions, 
Judge Dyk concluded that her references to government 
failures to maintain the MRGO tarnished her holding 
because it relied too much upon governmental failures of 
care.397 
I believe that Dyk erred in his assessment that Braden 
fatally overemphasized omissions, because I take note of her 
abundance of citations to positive governmental acts.398 
However, for the purposes of this article, I will accept his 
conclusion that she relied upon omissions in her takings 
analysis. I will thus query whether Blights Out’s rejection of 
the omission/commission distinction proves “on the  
wall[-ishly]” persuasive that it offers a formidable push-back 
to Dyk’s holding. 
Blights Out rejects any omission/commission distinction 
when making its case that that the people of New Orleans 
have been deprived of property due to the events 
surrounding Katrina and the city’s later related 
gentrification.399 As an organization inveighing against the 
“government” and “regime,” it rests responsibility in the 
state for making the people vulnerable to Katrina,400 failing 
 
 395. See id. at 746. 
 396. Id. 
 397. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he government’s failure to properly maintain or 
to modify the banks played a significant role in plaintiffs’ takings theory and the 
Claims Court’s analysis.”). 
 398. See Saint Bernard Par. I at 691–92. 
 399. See supra note 297. 
 400. On Blights Out’s argument that the government should be held 
responsible for the disaster of Katrina, see supra note 296. 
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to forgive taxes and liens,401 failing to provide decent housing 
fit for human beings for the people,402 allowing houses to fall 
into a state of disrepair,403 and permitting the forces of 
neoliberalism to redistribute New Orleans housing to a 
Whiter and wealthier population.404 The anguish that the 
people have suffered and the damage that these changes 
have brought to the community thicken their claim of 
wrongful deprivation,405 as do the racial impacts of these 
omissions, which fall heavily upon people of color.406 
Blights Out’s charges of cognizable takings caused by 
government omissions is coherent within other branches of 
Community Constitutionalism, as my work in Boyle Heights, 
Los Angeles shows.407 However, the large spectrum of 
omissions that Blights Out asks us to recognize (such as the 
government’s failure to put a stop to the depredations of 
neoliberalism) is not in line with mainstream jurisprudence’s 
current adumbration of takings responsibility. Simply put, 
the concept of passive takings has only received institutional 
attention within the last few years408 and its adherents 
recognize “takings by omissions” in a much more reduced set 
of circumstances than those acknowledged by Blights Out—
such as (as we will shortly see) when the government forbids 
self-help in environmental contexts and rising sea-levels 
 
 401. See Blights Out For Mayor, supra note 344. 
 402. See Blights Out for President, supra note 336. 
 403. See, e.g., supra note 324 and accompanying text (addressing the meaning 
of Live Action Painting). 
 404. See Blights Out for Mayor, supra note 344. 
 405. See, e.g., Interview with Carl Joe Williams, supra note 151. 
 406. Id. 
 407. See Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, supra note 34, at 163 
(“The strong version could snowball into a radical property constitutionalism that 
would strike down all neoliberal systems that deny poor people housing, 
regardless of state action.”). 
 408. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative 
Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 397 (2014). 
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destroy property.409 
Blights Out, then, lays down a variety of innovative and 
unorthodox ideas about how takings-by-omissions claims 
against the government can and should proceed (i.e., when a 
government permits market forces to create gentrification). 
However, its rejection of the omission/commission distinction 
itself does not count as an exotic theory. Rather, Blights 
Out’s argument that the omission/commission distinction 
lacks salience does find roots within the case law cited by 
Judge Dyk and also possesses impressive support among 
prestigious constitutional theory. 
That is, the argument that takings may be accomplished 
by government inaction is not off the wall. First, as Dyk 
himself asserts, Judge Braden depended on findings of 
government inaction to establish takings in Saint Bernard 
Parish I.410 Second, my reading of Sanguinetti, Ridge Line, 
and Arkansas Game & Fish, and Sponenbarger all 
demonstrate that those cases did not pivot on a hard 
omission/commission distinction.411 Moreover, in Arkansas 
Game & Fish, the government could be faulted for inaction, 
in failing to release water at a certain pace.412 
Third, in his seminal 2014 article Passive Takings, the 
influential413 property theorist Christopher Serkin argues 
that government inaction should, in some instances, give rise 
to takings claims.414 Serkin emphasizes passive takings that 
 
 409. Id. at 393 (“At least where there are no other available responses to sea-
level rise because of the conditions on a specific lot, static height limits can 
function as a kind of prohibition on self-help (in the form of elevating the building) 
and could therefore create a passive takings claim.”). 
 410. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 
F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 411. See supra text accompanying notes 186–227. 
 412. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 27–28 
(2012). 
 413. My Westlaw review of Serkin’s article reveals that, as of February 19, 
2019, Passive Takings has been cited in forty-three law review articles.  
 414. See Serkin, supra note 408, at 370 (“[T]he government’s relationship to 
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take place in the context of housing height restrictions that 
make populations vulnerable to rising sea-walls415 and when 
governments engage in or ban “armoring” that may create 
ecological damage or fail to protect homeowners from storm 
surges.416 Serkin relies upon several sources of authority for 
his analysis. While observing that the Supreme Court held 
that states bear no general affirmative duties to aid in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,417 Serkin teaches us that the Court there did 
insinuate that “the state may have an affirmative duty to 
protect if it created a danger or left people more susceptible 
to a danger.”418 Along with this support excavated from 
DeShaney,419 Serkin also looks to the theory of Hanoch 
 
property sometimes creates affirmative duties, and property owners are entitled 
either to summon the regulatory power of the state to act on their behalf or 
alternatively to receive compensation for the government’s failure to act or 
protect their property.”). 
 415. See id. at 393. 
 416. Id. at 394 (“Whether the government prohibits or builds sea walls, its 
near-total control over the allocation of the inevitable harm serves as a doctrinal 
hook for passive takings liability.). 
 417. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty., 489 U.S. 189, 189–90 (1989). 
 418. See Serkin, supra note 408, at 376 (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201). 
 419. Serkin also takes passing note of the support for this position found in 
Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 
(1st Cir. 1975) (“The purpose of the [Nonintercourse] Act [is to] guarantee the 
Indian tribes’ right of occupancy . . . and clearly there can be no meaningful 
guarantee without a corresponding federal duty to investigate and take such 
action as may be warranted in the circumstances.”) 
See Serkin, supra note 408, at 404. But see Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths 
of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 625 
(2006) (assessing that the Passamaquoddy finding of trust obligation was 
modified by the federal right of prosecutorial discretion, and that the decision had 
in any event been superseded by other decisions) (citing United States v. Navajo 
Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) and United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 
537 U.S. 465 (2003)). 
 Of equal notice in this field is also United States v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003), where the Supreme Court, upholding a decision 
by Dyk himself, determined that the U.S. government was subject to fiduciary 
duties of management and conservation of lands it held in trust for the White 
Mountain Apache Tribe where it occupied and exercised control over those lands. 
See also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & 
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Dagan, who argues for takings liability where regulatory 
burdens are not offset by reciprocal advantage420 and that of 
Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, who find property 
law enriched by the social obligations required by human 
flourishing.421 Within this body of jurisprudence, Serkin 
mines support for the conclusion that “focusing too narrowly 
on an affirmative-act requirement [in takings cases] can 
obscure the imposition of real and cognizable harm.”422 
Serkin also draws upon the “control principle” of Douglas 
Husak,423 who writes that, in criminal law, “sufficient control 
over a situation can substitute for an explicit act; control 
 
Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 625 (2006) (“The Supreme Court ruled 
that tribes cannot sue the United States for breach of trust unless a statute gives 
them a right to sue for money damages for such a breach . . . [or unless] the 
United States itself takes control over the land as it did in United States v. White 
Mountain Apache Tribe.”) (citations omitted). While White Mountain Apache 
Tribe concerns fiduciary duties and not takings claims, and while the Army Corps 
of Engineers did not occupy or control the entirety of Saint Bernard Parish or the 
Lower Ninth Ward, perhaps White Mountain Apache Tribe could also help build 
a foundation for a passive takings claim where there the federal government has 
exercised meaningful control or occupied a portion of the area allegedly taken. 
See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465. Of course, that Dyk found for 
the tribe in that case adds a special frisson for the purposes of its application to 
the facts of Saint Bernard Parish II. See his opinion at White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001), aff’d and 
remanded, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) (“We think that, to the extent that the 
government has actively used any part of the Tribe’s trust property, and has done 
so in a manner where its control over the buildings it occupies is essentially 
exclusive, the portions of the property that have been so used can no longer be 
classified as being held in merely a “bare trust” under Mitchell I. Rather, the 
government’s decision to use such trust property for its own purposes carries a 
responsibility to act as a fiduciary.”). 
 420. See Serkin, supra note 408, at 370 (citing Hanoch Dagan, Takings and 
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 769–70 (1999)). 
 421. Serkin, supra note 408, at 370 (citing Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. 
Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 134–36 
(2009)). 
 422. Id. at 374. 
 423. Id. at 378 (“Control, instead, means that the state has effectively 
determined the allocation of costs. This definition is closely analogous to Husak’s 
control principle as a basis for criminal liability. The intuition, again, is that 
sufficient control over a situation can substitute for an explicit act; control 
imposes an affirmative duty to act.”). 
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imposes an affirmative duty to act.”424 Serkin imports this 
idea into takings jurisprudence, and finds it expressed in the 
Arkansas Game & Fish case: There, since “the government 
almost completely controlled the allocation of costs from 
flooding—imposing costs either on the farmers if it released 
the water more quickly over a shorter duration or on the 
timber owners if it released the water more slowly over a 
longer period,”425 it bore responsibility for temporary takings 
regardless if the flooding emanated from omission or 
commission, since “that degree of control renders nonsensical 
any attempt to distinguish between acts and omissions in 
each of these scenarios. Such a level of control is sufficient to 
create a passive takings claim.”426 
Serkin does note that his passive takings theory creates 
a possible inequality problem, in that it distributes resources 
to presumably wealthy owners of beachfront properties.427 
He concludes that the inequality dilemma does not render 
his theory illegitimate, because the same risk presents itself 
in traditional takings analyses, “[a]nd the point here is 
simply that no reason exists to treat inaction any 
differently.”428 However, Serkin also does cite to progressive 
property theorists who argue that takings claims should be 
construed in favor of the politically powerless or the poor, 
and so hints at an interesting future development in passive 
takings jurisprudence429 that might be more ready to find 
 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at 380. 
 426. Id. On the role of control in creating a duty, see supra note 420 
(mentioning the relevance of the Supreme Court and Judge Dyk’s own Court of 
Appeals decisions in United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 
465, 475 (2003) and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 
1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 427. Serkin, supra note 408, at 400 (“Forcing the government to pay when 
zoning height limits interact with sea-level rise can effectuate an unappealing 
transfer of wealth from taxpayers to a small group of beachfront property owners 
who are probably already well-to-do.”). 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 365 (“Professor Dagan argues, in contrast, that takings protection 
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takings where the government has placed vulnerable 
communities in danger via omission. 
Thus, support for Blights Out’s position on 
omission/commission in the context of property justice can be 
found in Arkansas Game & Fish,430 the holding of Braden,431 
and the work of Serkin, who himself relies upon Deshaney, 
Dagan, Alexander, Penalver, and Husak.432 In fact, all of 
these resources work together to make a strong case for the 
meaninglessness of the act/failure distinction as it pertains 
to Saint Bernard Parish II. Meshing together the art of the 
Blights Out collective with Serkin’s theory and the facts of 
Katrina, we see federal government had a Hukasian control 
over “flooding hazards,”433 which (as I will show more in the 
next sub-section434) made the people more, not less, 
susceptible to danger (a la Deshaney); the vulnerable 
populations of New Orleans did not enjoy any of Dagan’s 
reciprocal advantage from the government’s failures to 
attend to those hazards;435 and the resulting dispossession of 
 
should be explicitly progressive, safeguarding the poor over the wealthy in order 
to offset the natural political pressures in the other direction.). See also Hanoch 
Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999) (illustrating 
this point); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. 
COMMENT. 279, 306 (1992) (“[B]ecause the legislature will usually offer 
compensation voluntarily, the takings clause can be defended as a prophylactic 
barrier against a serious form of discrimination against politically disfavored 
groups.”) (cited in Serkin, supra note 408, at note 80). 
 430. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 27–28 
(2012). 
 431. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 744 (2015). 
 432. See Serkin, supra note 408, at 370, 375. 
 433. This, again, is a quote from Sponenbarger. United States v. Sponenbarger, 
308 U.S. 256, 256 (1939). On the question of whether the people of New Orleans 
did, in fact, suffer greater risk as a result of government inaction, see infra notes 
471–485, arguing that governmental response to “flood[ing] hazards” 
encompassed more than the building and failure to maintain the MRGO or LPV, 
but also included FEMA’s failure of care and other catastrophes. 
 434. See infra text accompanying notes 471–485. 
 435. On reciprocal advantage, see Serkin, supra note 408, at 370; on lack of 
reciprocal advantage, see, e.g., Blights Out, supra note 2 (Blights Out claims that 
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property has so stymied Peñalver and Alexander’s human 
flourishing that Blights Out artists held a quasi-funeral for 
their homes in Home Court Crawl436 and complain that the 
people’s lodgings are unfit for human beings.437 
As this analysis shows, Balkin’s “on the wall” analysis 
does not just proceed from the law and legal theory to the 
work of Blights Out. Blights Out’s arguments also mutually 
reinforce the “passive takings” theory for two reasons: Blights 
Out’s emotionally-charged performances support the 
“omissions” thesis under a “law and the emotions” school of 
thought that seeks to incorporate affect in the “intelligent 
and responsible engagement by law.”438 Second, Blights Out 
possesses a special status as it is composed of community 
members who experience the real world effects of takings 
decisions in New Orleans: Based on the ethics of community 
constitutionalism439 and “artifact”-rich jurisprudence, which 
seeks to privilege the “buried”440 perspectives of vulnerable 
populations, Blights Out artists’ community credibility 
resonates with and strengthens Serkin’s Michigan Law 
Review-published theory441 on passive takings in this 
particular study of takings. 
Furthermore, to the extent that readers may grow 
concerned that the expansion of takings analyses offered by 
Blights Out’s legal thought could ricochet into yet another 
tool of the wealthy to extract lucre from the less-advantaged, 
observe how Blights Out continually emphasizes race and 
class vulnerability in their analysis:442 In so doing, they offer 
 
people of color in New Orleans are living in “apartheid”). 
 436. See TURNER, supra note 293, at 103. 
 437. See Blights Out, supra note 332. 
 438. Abrams & Keren, supra note 271, at 2000.  
 439. See Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, supra note 34. 
 440. See id. 
 441. See generally, Serkin, supra note 408, at 345. 
 442. Of special importance here is Blights Out’s interest not only in people who 
own their homes, but also those who rent. See, e.g., Interview with Carl Joe 
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yet more support for a passive takings jurisprudence that 
remains alert to inequality, and aspires most to give back to 
the poor and marginalized. Blights Out, then, buttresses 
Serkin’s tacit suggestion that passive takings should skew 
toward the poor, as well as Dagan’s inequality-centered 
takings analyses.443 
In the end, Serkin, Braden, the Supreme Court cases, 
and the moral, historical, and emotional and local weight of 
Blights Out’s rejection of the omission/commission 
distinction weighs in favor of a reconsideration, and 
rejection, of Dyk’s reversal of Braden on the grounds that she 
over-emphasized government failures of care.444 
Importantly, the efforts of Blights Out’s artists supports this 
conclusion, by showing us that the omission/commission 
distinction fails to recognize the real hurt the government 
has subjected the people of New Orleans to,445 and so should 
be rejected as a prime mover in takings law. 
2. Is Blights Out’s theory of the relevant “totality of the 
government’s actions” off the wall? 
As discussed above, Judge Dyk reversed Judge Braden 
because he concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish that the construction or operation of MRGO caused 
their injury.446 Dyk maintained that a valid causation 
 
Williams, supra note 151. (“Right after Katrina happened there was a lot of price 
gouging, and at the time I had a little small place I was living at 400 bucks, and 
it was a small spot, but it was cheap, but it went up like 750 bucks right after 
Katrina. It wasn’t under a lease so they could do that.”). Blights Out’s conceptions 
of legal rights in property, then, are coherent with other community 
constitutionalisms that I have studied, including those of Boyle Heights 
residents, who sought property interests for renters. See Murray, The Takings 
Clause of Boyle Heights, supra note 34, at 126 (discussing the rights of renters 
with Aldo Medina). 
 443. See Serkin, supra note 408. 
 444. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[o]n a takings theory, the government cannot be 
liable for failure to act, but only for affirmative acts by the government.”). 
 445. See supra text accompanying notes 382–382. 
 446. St. Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1362. 
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analysis needed to consider how events would have unfolded 
if the government had simply done nothing.447 Dyk 
determined that the plaintiffs undermined their ability to 
make such proofs since they fought against any 
consideration of the Barrier plan’s effects on flooding.448 Dyk 
chastised the plaintiffs for failing to “ask[] not whether the 
whole of the government action caused the plaintiffs’ 
injury,”449 and for omitting to take account of “other 
government actions” that “may well have placed the plaintiffs 
in a better position than if the government had taken no 
action at all.”450 Citing cases such as Arkansas Game, he 
specified at length that the causation analysis must consider 
“all government actions.”451 Dyk also cited Sponenbarger, 
which requires that takings claimants offer proofs that 
takings occurred within a government “program measured in 
its entirety”452—there, where the government “undert[ook] to 
safeguard a large area from existing flood hazards”453 
through “a comprehensive ten-year program for the entire 
valley . . . .”454 
What was the federal government’s response to Katrina, 
as measured in its entirety? As demonstrated above,455 
Blights Out artists offer a very wide window within which to 
view federal, Katrina-related conduct to see whether it 
 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. at 1363 (“Plaintiffs on appeal are clear that in their view the LPV 
levees cannot be considered in the causation analysis.”). 
 449. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). 
 450. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). 
 451. Id. at 1364 (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 
1364, 1372 n.2. (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 452. Id. (citing United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1939)). 
 453. Sponenbarger, 256 U.S. at 265. 
 454. Id. at 262. Dyk also cited John B. Hardwicke Co. v. United States, 467 
F.2d 488 (Ct. Cl. 1972), where the Court of Claims considered the building of two 
dams when considering whether there was a taking. See Saint Bernard Parish II 
at 1364. 
 455. See supra text accompanying notes 369–371. 
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wrongfully takes property: It considers not only the events of 
the storm (which it pondered through its story circles, 
initiated in 2015 in honor of Katrina’s anniversary),456 but 
also looked forward thirteen years457 to later changes in New 
Orleans’ property values and demographics. Blights Out 
artists attribute this gentrification to the acts and omissions 
of the government and its “regime.”458 Thus, Blights Out is 
in accord with Dyk’s assessment that takings claims remain 
alert to the entirety of,459 the totality of,460 and all461 
government action (and omission) that bears a connection to 
Katrina, and finds that in no way has the sum of government 
conduct and inaction left the people in a “better” situation.462 
Still, Blights Out’s wide scope probably moves beyond 
the “totality” imagined by Judge Dyk. In his analysis of 
Arkansas Game and Sponenbarger, Dyk appears to mean 
that term to relate to actions designed to deal with “flood 
hazards”463—he observes specifically how, in Arkansas 
 
 456. Interview with Mariama Eversley, supra note 327; see also An Invitation 
is a Call to Action, or, A Composite Prose or Portrait of What Folks from Blights 
Out are Feeling, Thinking, & Talking About on the 10th Anniversary of Katrina, 
BLIGHTS OUT (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.blightsout.org/home (“On August 15, 
2015, members of Blights Out—natives and newcomers—were asked to share one 
word to describe how they were feeling as the 10th Anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina approached. Dueling, conflicting, entwined emotions about the future 
were exposed: fear and anxiety tempered with optimism and hope. These single 
words sparked a profound conversation about what it means to belong to and 
become part of a place and a community.”). 
 457. My study of Blights Out stops in 2018. 
 458. See Blights Out, supra note 16. 
 459. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (St. Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 460. See id. at 1364. 
 461. See id. at 1365.  
 462. Id. at 1363 (“The result is that plaintiffs failed to take account of other 
government actions—specifically the LPV project including the construction of a 
vast system of levees to protect against hurricane damage—that mitigated the 
impact of MRGO and may well have placed the plaintiffs in a better position than 
if the government had taken no action at all.”). 
 463. Id. at 1361 (citing United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 265 
(1939)). 
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Game, the Supreme Court focused on the building of a dam 
as well as the letting of waters.464 It should be said that the 
ten-year window465 noted in Sponenbarger does hew to a 
similar timeline advocated by Blights Out artists.466 
Nevertheless, perhaps Blights Out’s citation of gentrification 
and government support of market forces veer too far away 
from the precedent of Arkansas Game, and the art collective’s 
vast vantage will be considered “off the wall.”467 
Yet, even if we constrain ourselves to consider “all 
government actions”468 to manage (qua Sponenbarger) 
Katrina-related “flood hazards,”469 then Blights Out’s 
generous vision of the “totality of government actions” and 
omissions470 inspires us to consider quite a few other federal 
government behaviors that conspired to separate New 
Orleanians from their property. 
What else did the Federal government do, or not do, in 
relationship to Katrina’s “flood hazards?” The list is long. On 
the plus side for the government: Once the storm hit, FEMA 
did offer some supplies to Superdome shelterers471 and 
114,000 households were housed in FEMA trailers after 
 
 464. Id. at 1364–65 (“[I]n that case, the government built a dam and then 
released water (a deviation from policy) that flooded the plaintiff’s property. We 
explained that ‘the proper comparison would be between the flooding that 
occurred prior to the construction of [the dam] and the flooding that occurred 
during the deviation period,’ emphasizing that the causation analysis considers 
causation based on the entirety of government action, not merely the deviation 
from the original water-release policy.”). 
 465. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 262 (1939). 
 466. See Blights Out, supra note 6. 
 467. See Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided,” supra note 38. 
 468. See St. Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1364. 
 469. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 265. 
 470. See supra Part V. 
 471. Matthew Davis, Fema ‘knew of New Orleans danger,’ BBC, http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4331330.stm (last updated Oct. 11, 2005, 7:52 PM) 
(reporting that FEMA “positioned resources” at the Superdome but that they 
turned out to be woefully inadequate). 
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Katrina.472 Further, the National Guard airlifted 
approximately 88,000 people to safety (from all of Louisiana 
and Mississippi),473 and Bureau Chief Lt. General Steven 
Blum congratulated his troops for being “in the water” in 
New Orleans “within four hours of the storm” and “saving 
lives” in “on the streets and in the air.474 
But while these aid missions saved lives, other 
government conduct proved so disastrously inept that it 
needlessly disconnected residents from their communities 
and houses. For one thing, the federal government did not 
alert to—or seem to care about—that it created a foreseeable 
risk of storm surge by building the MRGO and destroying 
wetlands.475 Further, after the storm hit, FEMA committed 
a catastrophic failure to come to the aid of residents placed 
at risk from the flood,476 leading to such atrocities as a 
nightmarish body count in the streets,477 unimaginably 
painful conditions at the Superdome,478 and a waste of ice 
that could have helped overheated patients at New Orleans’ 
 
 472. Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN (Updated Aug. 8, 2019, 6:48 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/ 
index.html. 
 473. John Orrell, Hurricane Katrina Response: National Guard’s “Finest 
Hour,” THE U.S. ARMY (Aug. 27, 2010), https://www.army.mil/article/44368/ 
hurricane_katrina_response_national_guards_finest_hour. 
 474. Ernest E. Rogers III, The Army National Guard and The Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a521959.pdf. 
 475. See, e.g., St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 
121 Fed. Cl. 687, 699 (2015) (“In 1958, the United States Fish & Wildlife 
Service . . . warned the Army Corps [of Engineers] that [the channel] could result 
in major ecological change of the area.”). 
 476. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 275 (Feb. 15, 
2006) (“With only nominal amounts of medical supplies pre-positioned by FEMA 
and HHS, a great deal of medical provisions had to be supplied after Katrina 
made landfall. In areas like New Orleans, it took days to respond to the 
catastrophe and deliver medical supplies to the Superdome and Convention 
Center. The delays were a result of poor planning.”). 
 477. See supra note 105. 
 478. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 87, at 7. 
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Memorial Hospital, the site of “mercy” killings.479 George 
Bush and his threats of “zero tolerance” that would be 
exhibited by the National Guard intimidated residents with 
threats of violence and “overwhelming force”480 that may 
have caused them to fear that the Guard would remove them 
from their homes,481 and take over the city as occupying 
troops.482 Moreover, the National Guard airlifted New 
Orleanians to places like Salt Lake City, but the federal 
government did not give the passengers adequate resources 
for communicating with NOLA residents or knowing how to 
get back.483 
It may even be possible (though, admittedly, less so) to 
identify federal conduct related to “flood hazards” in the 
events of Danziger Bridge, since the NOLA police shootings 
of James Brissette and Ronald Madison on September 5 
occurred during the local government’s panicked reaction to 
the storm—but the malfeasance of federal prosecutors later 
led to a diminution of the sentences that the officers received 
ultimately for the homicides and cover-up.484 While I lack 
 
 479. Carrie Kahn, New Orleans Hospital Staff Discussed Mercy Killings, NPR 
(Feb. 16, 2006, 4:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=5219917. 
 480. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 87, at 171. 
 481. Mark Guarino, Misleading Reports of Lawlessness After Katrina Worsened 
Crisis, Officials Say, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/16/hurricane-katrina-new-orleans-looting-
violence-misleading-reports (“Mike Kelly, 60, a former sniper in Iraq who was 
shipped to New Orleans with the national guard, said people they encountered 
were often afraid of being forced to leave their houses.”). 
 482. Cf. id. (“After an initial confrontation, the officers left. ‘I own this town. 
You don’t. Now get the fuck out of here,’ Kelly said he told them.”); Jonah Walters, 
A Guide to Hurricane Katrina and Its Aftermath, JACOBIN, https:// 
www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/hurricane-katrina-bush-gulf-new-orleans-climate 
-change-racism-fema/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“In the weeks and months that 
followed Katrina, working-class residents of New Orleans saw their city 
transformed into a literal police state, where movement was monitored and storm 
victims were marked as criminals and delinquents by hostile police and National 
Guard forces.”). 
 483. See infra note 492.  
 484. See Danziger Bridge Officers sentenced 7 to 12 years for shooters, cop in 
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any causal proofs of this, I will suggest that this trauma and 
resulting disgust485 may have further severed New 
Orleanians’ connection with their city and so their houses. 
How did this sum of the totality of government conduct 
take property? It shows us that the federal government did 
not disunite people from their homes just by creating a 
hurricane delivery system in the form of MRGO (which may 
or may not have been offset to some degree by the LPV). 
While Judge Braden, in Saint Bernard Parish I, noted that 
owners could not reach their houses for a “significant” 
amount of time due to flooding,486 that does not paint the 
entire picture of why people were severed from their homes. 
“All government conduct” also frightened, shocked, and 
deterred people from returning to their domiciles—either by 
allowing New Orleans to descend into death and chaos and 
triggering a diaspora,487 or by actually, physically preventing 
residents from having access to their properties.488 Again, 
property abandonment and people’s inabilities to interact 
with their houses exacerbated the damage that New Orleans 
 
cover-up gets 3, supra note 121. 
 485. See Love Wins All the Time, comment to Andy Grim, 5 NOPD officers will 
get new trial in Danziger Bridge case, Appeals Court Rules, NOLA.COM (Aug. 18, 
2015, 9:44 PM), https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/08/5_nopd_officers_ 
will_get_new_t.html (“Heartbreaking”); Shrev Birdman, comment, id. (Aug. 18, 
2015, 7:59 PM) (“This is just racist strategy to get these cops . . . .”). 
 486. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 746 (2015). 
 487. See Dennis Devine, Katrina Survivors Touch Down in San Diego, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB (Sept. 5, 2005, 2:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune 
.com/sdut-katrina-survivors-touch-down-in-san-diego-2005sep05-story.html 
(“His wife shuddered thinking of the terrifying tide of corpses floating in the flood. 
‘I couldn’t go back to that,’ Denise Powell said. ‘Some of them could be my 
family.’”); Jamie Goward, We will never return, say survivors of drowned city, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2005, 7:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2005/sep/11/hurricanekatrina.usa (“‘We’re heading up north to Chicago to get on 
to higher ground. To a city with a different energy,’ [former NOLA resident Igor] 
Szymanski said. He feels the Windy City won’t leave him isolated as New Orleans 
did, should it suffer a natural catastrophe.”). 
 488. See supra note 125. 
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properties suffered, leading to the “blight”489 documented by 
Blights Out in Live Action Painting490 and irretrievable loss 
of property. 
As former NOLA resident Linda Santi (who is not a part 
of Blights Out) described the reasons for property 
abandonment to me in a telephone interview on December 
27, 2018, 
You couldn’t get to your house . . . . [And once you went away,] it 
was hard to come back. Emotionally and physically. Remember 
that . . . not everyone had cell phones . . . it was incredibly difficult 
to talk communicate to people . . . it was hard and with flip 
phones . . . You didn’t have a lot of intelligence and you didn’t have 
a way back and your car was ruined because [say,] you stayed [and 
then were airlifted away] . . . and if that was the case, [people] . . . 
had just landed wherever the plane dropped them, which [in my 
case] was Salt Lake City . . . so just trying to find out what was 
going on and what you had to do and where everybody was, was 
incredibly hard for people . . . it just worked your last nerve . . . . 
[But if you did come back to New Orleans,] there were buses that 
[would] let you go past [your house. These buses started] at The 
Sanchez Community Center on Claiborne.491 [The military put] 
shrinks [on the buses] and [we would all] would ride on the bus . . . 
so you could drive past your house and see if it was gone or standing, 
but you couldn’t get out. 
[On these buses,] it was remarkable to hear the fatalistic humor [—
at first, people would say things like] “oh look, there’s Uncle Peet’s 
truck, why’s it on my roof? . . . Or, “that’s Mr. Gerald’s couch, what’s 
that doing on the pole?” And people would kind of at the beginning 
laugh about how crazy everything was and then the bus would get 
 
 489. Gillian B. White, A Housing Crisis Amid Tens of Thousands of Abandoned 
Homes, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2015/08/new-orleans-blight-hurricane-katrina/401843/ (“New Orleans’s 
abandoned houses, their entrances sealed with graffiti-covered plywood, are 
common. They pepper the landscape becoming more and more frequent as you 
drive from ritzier neighborhoods to poorer ones. The most ominous look as if 
they’re being reclaimed by the land, with tall grass and unpruned shrubs 
shrouding them, weeds and vines growing through every crack.”). 
 490. See supra text accompanying notes 304–326. 
 491. See Katy Reckdahl, The Andrew ‘Pete’ Sanchez Multi-Service Center, 
NRPA (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nrpa.org/parks-recreation-magazine/2017/ 
september/the-andrew-pete-sanchez-multi-service-center/ (describing the corner 
as “a hub”). 
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so overwhelming, and everybody would just get quiet. [She cries.]492 
Blights Out’s wide vision of the government behavior, 
combined with Arkansas Game & Fish’s and Sponenbarger’s 
limiting factor of “flood hazards,” together give us a wider 
scope of “all government action” related to the storm than 
that considered by Judge Dyk. From this perspective, could 
a reasonable person493 find that the government placed the 
people of Saint Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward 
in a worse position relative to their property494 than if it had 
acted otherwise or not acted at all? It is definitely possible. 
And, as we see with the emotive testimony of Linda Santi, it 
is difficult to discern how such a conclusion would be 
considered off the wall. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Communities possess their own legal thought. Artists do 
too. In Blights Out, we see a fusion of these jurisprudences, 
in the form of a body of work by artists in New Orleans that 
leverages specific arguments about “causation” and the 
concept of the “totality of the government’s actions.” These 
arguments have direct bearing upon the legal problems 
addressed in Saint Bernard Parish I and II. 
In Saint Bernard Parish I, Judge Braden held that the 
U.S., via the Army Corps of Engineers, had temporarily 
taken property from people in the Lower Ninth Ward and 
Saint Bernard Parish by building, expanding, maintaining, 
and failing to maintain the MRGO: She determined that the 
MRGO caused the flooding and so constituted a taking under 
 
 492. Interview with Linda Santi, supra note 111.  
 493. Courts engage their reason to determine whether government behavior 
caused takings. See, e.g., Pashley v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 737, 738 (Ct. Cl. 
1957) (“We think the proof shows that the flooding of plaintiffs’ property was 
caused by the erection of the dam.”). 
 494. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. II), 887 F.3d 
1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (querying whether the government put the plaintiffs 
in a better position). 
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Arkansas Game & Fish.495 On appeal, Judge Dyk reversed, 
holding that Braden had impermissibly pivoted her takings 
analysis upon government inaction, and because her 
causation analysis proved flawed, as she had failed to 
consider the ameliorating effects of the LPV.496 
The artists of Blights Out maintain that the 
“government,” or the “regime,” has wrongfully dispossessed 
poor people of color in New Orleans of property through 
systematic and wide-ranging neglect that extends from 
Katrina in 2005 to gentrification in 2018. In works such as 
Home Court Crawl, Live Action Painting, and 50 Years Later, 
We Still Need Housing Fit for Human Beings, Blights Out 
contends that property may be wrested from the people via 
government omissions.497 And in works such as the “October” 
billboard498 (which describes ecological apartheid that will 
create a gentrified forest protecting the wealthy from the 
rising-up of seas and people), Development Without 
Displacement, Trauma is Planned into Architecture, and the 
November/Disaster Capitalism billboard, the artists look at 
a wide sequence of events to gauge that taking. 
The theories of popular and community 
constitutionalism, demosprudence, and “artifacts” give us 
license to consider these resources when studying the 
question of whether Judge Dyk’s holding in Saint Bernard 
Parish II stands up to scrutiny. Moreover, when asking 
whether Blights Out’s jurisprudence is “off the wall,” we see 
how its essential arguments about the irrelevance of the 
omission/commission distinction and its generous attitude 
toward “totality” withstand Jack Balkin’s famous tests. 
Furthermore, we also discern that when we add Blights 
Out’s insights to existing jurisprudence—Christopher 
 
 495. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States (Saint Bernard Par. I), 121 Fed. 
Cl. 687, 746 (2015). 
 496. St. Bernard Par. II, 887 F.3d at 1365. 
 497. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 298–99. 
 498. See Ecological Apartheid, supra note 2. 
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Serkin’s theory of passive takings, say—that the legitimizing 
feedback works both ways. 
In the end, we learn that Judge Dyk’s decision that 
inaction cannot leverage a takings finding and his narrow 
obsession with the LPV crack under the pressure imposed by 
Blights Out’s passionate and incisive theories of causation 
and “totality.” Together with plain readings of Supreme 
Court opinions and prestigious property theory, the artists’ 
insights teach us that, in 2005, the federal government could 
and did take property from the people of New Orleans within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
